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Abstract 
In this report, I introduce a hybrid approach for certifying security properties of cloud services 
that combines monitoring and testing data. This report argues about the need for hybrid 
certification and examines the basic characteristics of hybrid certification models. 
The certification of cloud service security has become a necessity due to the on-going concerns 
about cloud security and the need to increase cloud trustworthiness through rigorous assessments 
of security by trusted third parties. Unlike the certification of security in traditional software 
systems, which is based on static forms of security assessment (e.g., the Common Criteria 
model), the certification of cloud service security requires continuous assessment. This is 
because cloud services are provisioned through dynamic infrastructures operating under security 
controls and other configurations that may change dynamically introducing unforeseen 
vulnerabilities. Cloud service security can also be compromised because of attacks on co-tenant 
services. 
Recent work on cloud service certification applies dynamic forms of security assessment, 
notably dynamic testing or continuous monitoring. These overcome some of the limitations of 
traditional security certification and audits (e.g. they produce machine readable certificates 
incorporating dynamically collected evidence). However, there are cases where existing 
approaches cannot provide an adequate level of assurance. Testing, for instance, may be 
insufficient for transactional services, as it is normally performed through a special testing (as 
opposed to the operational) service interface. Monitoring-based certification may also be 
insufficient if there is conflicting or inconclusive evidence in monitoring data; such data may, 
for example, not cover all traces of system events that should be seen to assess a property. 
 
To overcome such problems, I am working on a hybrid approach for certifying cloud service 
security that can combine both monitoring and testing evidence. For that reason, I designed a 
new cloud certification approach supporting the automated and continuous certification of 
security properties of cloud services based on the combination of dynamically acquired testing 
and monitoring evidence that can deliver the high level of assurance and can overcome the 
limitations of assessments based on each of these types of evidence in isolation. My approach is 
based on the cloud certification framework of the CUMULUS EU FP7 project. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
In this report, my research along with my work on hybrid security certification of cloud services 
is presented. More specifically, the subject of my research, the aim, the scope and the objectives 
behind my research are described in thorough detail, in addition to the problems that I am aiming 
to solve and the solutions to existing problems that my contribution provides. Finally, a literature 
review about the current approaches on hybrid certification is provided.  
 
1.2 Motivation and definition of the research problem 
Cloud computing is a highly emerging market. However, there are numerable concerns about the 
security of cloud services and the privacy of data that resides in the cloud. For that reason, the 
cloud security needs to be increased through rigorous assessments of security by trusted third 
parties. In cloud computing, the certification of the cloud relies on dynamic forms of assessment, 
as cloud services are provisioned through dynamic infrastructures operating under security 
controls and other configurations that may change dynamically introducing vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, the potential attacks on co-tenant services can compromise the service security. 
The notion of dynamic assessment includes continuous assessment, unlike the certification of 
security in traditional systems, where the certification is based solely on static forms of 
assessment. Recent work on cloud service certification applies dynamic forms of security 
assessment, namely dynamic testing or continuous monitoring, but the existing dynamic 
certification approaches are unable to provide the required level of assurance for cloud service 
security. To overcome the problems mentioned, I am working on a hybrid approach for 
certifying cloud service security that combines both monitoring and testing evidence. My 
objective is to certify the security of cloud services by providing executable certification models 
that can be used to drive the certification process and generate certificates. The evidence that 
will be used in the certification process is collected through testing and monitoring of these 
cloud services. The approach described will cover cases where testing is triggered by monitoring 
and vice-versa, along with cases where testing and monitoring are independent and the outcomes 
from each form of assessment (i.e. testing or monitoring) do not trigger the other form of 
assessment. 
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Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction [9]. Cloud technology refers to an Internet-based technology through 
which information is stored in servers and provided as a service (Software as a Service, or SaaS) 
and on-demand to clients (from the “clouds” indeed) and offers the opportunity for efficient 
utilisation of resources through the provision of compute, data, storage, and network capabilities 
as services on demand [1][2]. Over the past decades, several things have changed. At the 
moment, cloud computing represents a continuing evolution away from the decentralised IT 
systems of the previous decades and is already transforming providers of IT services, changing 
the way other industrial sectors provision their IT needs, as well as the way citizens interact with 
their computers and mobile devices [3]. At the same time, cloud computing is continuously 
evolving and has emerged as a popular paradigm for harnessing a large number of commodity 
machines in the cloud, increasing the capacity and adding new capabilities dynamically without 
investing in new infrastructure, training new personnel or licensing new software [4][5][6].  
Cloud computing is one of the most fast growing segments in the IT industry. But as more and 
more information is placed on the cloud, concerns about security, data privacy and protection 
start to arise. One of the main concerns is related to the physical location of data stored on the 
cloud, as cloud computing data spreads across multiple geographic areas [6][7]. Companies 
outsource the management of security to third parties that host their IT assets. The co-existence 
of assets of multiple tenants who use the same instance of service, in the same location, along 
with the lack of security guarantees in the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between cloud 
providers and cloud consumers, poses a big threat to the security and the protection of data in the 
cloud. The probability of attacks when this set of assets is available publicly makes security 
questionable [8]. Other vulnerabilities, risks and threats associated with security in cloud 
computing contain loss of governance, data, application and service portability when it comes to 
migration of data and services, failure of mechanisms separating storage, memory, routing and 
even reputation between different tenants, compliance risks, data protection issues, information 
leakage, malicious attacks and management interface compromise, application security and 
security related to third-party resources [6][9][11][12]. 
The worldwide public cloud services reached a total market size of $45.7 billion and the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) expects this market to grow at a compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of 23% until 2018 [13][14]. The certification of cloud service security has become 
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a necessity due to on-going concerns about cloud security and the need to increase cloud security 
through rigorous assessments of security by trusted third parties [1][9]. The certification of 
security in traditional software systems is based on static forms of security assessment (e.g., the 
Common Criteria model, ISO 27001, ISAE 3402 /SSAE 16 Type II, and EuroCloud Star Audit 
[15][17]). However, the nature of cloud computing introduces certain characteristics that make 
the current certification approaches ineffective [16][17]. Cloud computing can deliver a vast 
array of IT capabilities in real time using many different types of resources. Cloud computing 
systems are on-demand, automated, elastic, location-independent, and multi-tenant, providing 
dynamic scalability, on-demand self-service and multitenancy and geographical dispersal of 
services [16][18][19][20][21]. Consequently, it is important to take into account the dynamics of 
the cloud and rely on a dynamic certification mechanism.  
The certification of cloud service security requires continuous assessment [26]. This is because 
cloud services are provisioned through dynamic infrastructures operating under security controls 
and other configurations that may change dynamically introducing unforeseen vulnerabilities 
(e.g., a zero-day vulnerability in HyperVM server virtualization was exploited to delete 100,000 
websites using it for hosting purposes [22]). Furthermore, as cloud services share the 
infrastructures they are deployed in with other services, their security can be compromised as a 
consequence of attacks on their co-tenant services (fate sharing effect). An example of this was 
the permanent data loss of all co-tenant services of Megaupload following the suspension of one 
of its services due to copyright infringement [23]. Cloud service security cannot be fully 
guaranteed, according to the existing research, as cloud providers offer different services, such 
as Software as a service (SaaS), Platform as a service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS), and, each service has its own security issues [28]. Additionally, there is an uncertainty 
about the security of customers’ services once they are migrated to the cloud, as it is not easy for 
an organisation to control the processes and data when data is outside the perimeter of the 
company [9][29]. Assuring cloud security is a costly process and cannot be afforded by small 
enterprises. Last but not least, the introduction of vulnerabilities such as breach of integrity, 
confidentiality and customer privacy; reduced software protection, application and data 
availability; and authentication, authorization and accounting vulnerabilities, along with the 
opaque service offerings that do not allow users to monitor the systems, make the problem of 
assuring cloud security even stronger [9][29][30][31]. Under such circumstances, the desired 
security properties need to be assessed continually whilst a service is in operation [25]. 
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It is worth mentioning that the security verification is affected by the interference between the 
features and the behaviour of inter-dependent services at any of the layers in the cloud stack [9]. 
The privacy of the data processed by cloud software services may be affected by dynamic 
changes in them, resulting in non-regulatory compliance and absence of compliance with 
organisational security policies [1][31]. More specifically, changes in cloud services that happen 
during run-time can result in unexpected liabilities and inter-dependency issues. At the moment, 
there is no cloud provider that can guarantee no interaction between cloud features, so the final 
user of cloud services may accuse the cloud service supplier of being responsible for failing to 
withhold cloud service properties. Some of these vulnerabilities and violations, though, may be 
caused by the dependencies between the services and the cloud, that might affect to a great 
extent the performance of the cloud and the availability of the services at all layers in the cloud, 
leading to ownership problems [1][9][31]. For that reason, while traditional certification 
techniques focus on monolithic systems (e.g., the Common Criteria model [15][35][36]) there is 
the need for service-based certification, which has already been addressed, but it focuses only on 
certifying services during design-time, failing to address the certification of inter-dependent 
services, including static and monolithic proofs for services [33][34]. 
In response to this need, recent work on cloud service certification applies dynamic forms of 
security assessment, namely dynamic testing (e.g. [24]) or continuous monitoring (e.g. [27][37]), 
as the certification of different types of cloud services can be effective only if it relies on 
dynamic forms of assessment, overcoming some of the limitations of traditional security 
certification and audits (e.g. they produce machine readable certificates incorporating 
dynamically collected evidence) [38]. Unlike traditional certification approaches, in dynamic 
cloud service certification, the aim is to produce machine-readable certificates containing a 
specification of the security property that they certify and the cloud service asset that this 
property refers to (aka target of certification (TOC)), as well as evidence demonstrating the 
satisfaction of the examined security property [26][38]. 
Existing dynamic certification approaches overcome some of the limitations of the traditional 
security certification and audits. However, under certain circumstances they may also be unable 
to provide the required level of assurance for cloud service security. Testing, for instance, may 
be insufficient for transactional services, as it is typically performed through a special interface 
of the service that is being certified, rather than its normal operational interface [38][39]. 
Monitoring based certification may also turn out to be insufficient in cases where there is 
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conflicting evidence within the monitoring data or in cases where such data do not cover all 
potential traces of system events that should be seen in order to assess a given property [26][38]. 
In order to overcome the problems above, I have developed a hybrid approach for certifying 
cloud service security that could combine both monitoring and testing evidence. My approach is 
based on the cloud certification framework of the CUMULUS EU FP7 project that provides 
models, processes and tools supporting the certification of compliance and security properties of 
all types of cloud services, through the use of multiple types of evidence including testing and 
monitoring [1][38]. The basic idea behind a hybrid certification model is to cross-check evidence 
regarding a security property that has been gathered from testing and monitoring. If there is no 
conflict between testing and monitoring evidence, the evidence will be combined. For example, 
let us suppose that we want to certify cloud service availability. If availability is measured as the 
percentage of the calls to service operations for which a response was produced with a given time 
period d, a monitoring check should verify exactly this condition. However, the trace of service 
calls that has been examined by the monitoring process might not cover all the operations in the 
service interface or the expected peak workload periods of the underlying infrastructure. In such 
cases, before issuing a certificate for service availability, it would be necessary to test any of the 
above service usage conditions that have not been covered yet. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The problem I face is to enable the automated and continuous certification of security properties 
of cloud services. The research objective is to design a new cloud certification approach and 
develop a framework supporting the automated and continuous certification of security 
properties of cloud services based on the combination of dynamically acquired testing and 
monitoring evidence that can deliver the high level of assurance required for trustworthy 
certificates, and can overcome the limitations of assessments based on each of these types of 
evidence in isolation, as monitoring-based approaches are insufficient when there is conflicting 
evidence, and test-based certification approaches are not effective when there are transactional 
services. The hybrid approach that I am proposing will reduce uncertainty arising from reliance 
on any of the testing and monitoring evidence in isolation.  
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The steps that will lead to the achievement of the research objective are presented below: 
 
• Literature Review 
The current security certification mechanisms will be reviewed and I will provide an analysis of 
the certification models that exist and are used in order to certify service security in the cloud. I 
will present the different test-based and monitoring-based certification models that are used for 
cloud service certification, the current approaches, the related work and the state of the art. My 
analysis will cover the description of the different frameworks, along with their strengths and 
weaknesses, focusing on the existing issues that will be resolved with my research. 
 
• Develop a schema for defining hybrid certification models 
Firstly, I will define a schema that will support the definition of executable certification models 
that can be used to drive the certification process and generate the certificates. The certification 
of security properties will be based on the collection of monitoring and testing evidence. 
Monitoring will be continuous, so that it can cover changes at any layer of the cloud that might 
affect properties already certified, and will cover any changes that might occur. The monitoring 
evidence will be combined with testing evidence to cover dynamic certification. 
	
• Develop a certification infrastructure that will enable certification based on hybrid 
models 
In order to create hybrid certificates, a hybrid certification infrastructure is essential. For that 
reason, automatic monitoring combined with testing, needs to be supported. The data collected 
from monitoring and tested need to be analysed to provide the evidence for the hybrid model. 
The data will be correlated in different ways according to the security property examined. So, I 
will develop tools and mechanisms that will support the analysis of testing and monitoring data 
that are gathered and are used as evidence in order to generate and issue the hybrid certificates, 
based on hybrid certification models. Additionally, the mechanisms integrated will support the 
management of certificates, making the certificates available to cloud customers and providers. 
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To achieve this, the existing CUMULUS framework will be used, but it will be amended to 
support the hybrid certification. 
 
• Evaluation of the hybrid independent approach 
Research will be accompanied with the evaluation of the hybrid certification approach that will 
confirm the reliability, trustworthiness and real applicability of the proposed model to the 
industry. 
 
 
1.4 Research Contributions 
The research presented in this report provides novel hybrid security certification models for 
certifying services in the cloud, extending the current certification approaches that exist and are 
currently used in the industry, most of which are based on monitoring or testing.  
For that reason, a schema for defining hybrid certification models will be introduced to enable 
the automatic certification of service properties based on testing and monitoring evidence. 
Additionally, certain security properties of services in the cloud will be assessed and certified 
according to the proposed model. The realisation of the above will be made with the provision of 
a hybrid infrastructure that will support hybrid certification. The proposed models aspire to 
resolve the gaps arising from current certification models that are based on testing or monitoring. 
Additionally, I will contribute to the development of a dynamic certification mechanism that will 
be able to certify cloud services in any layer of the cloud stack. My approach is based on the 
automation of collecting data through testing and monitoring, thus making the certification 
process efficient, effective and easy to be customised by the user. 
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1.5 Report Outline 
The rest of this report is structured as follows. 
The second chapter includes the literature review that has been used for my research. The topics 
that are covered include the software and service certification, the test-based certification, the 
monitoring-based certification, along with current dynamic certification approaches and the state 
of the art. Additionally, the strong and weak points of each method are presented, and I describe 
what issues are solved by the use of the proposed hybrid approach. Furthermore, a comparison 
between the traditional approaches and the proposed framework is presented, showing how my 
approach can add value to existing certification schemes. A distinction between trustworthiness 
and security is presented in the end of this chapter. It is worth clarifying that my research 
provides higher security in certifying services in the cloud, but advanced security does not 
always imply advanced trustworthiness, as explained in detail in the end of the second chapter. 
The third chapter includes the description of the hybrid approach. In this chapter I explain why a 
certification authority should use hybrid certification models, and I describe the different modes 
of hybrid models that exist, showing how they fill current gaps in security certification. 
Moreover, the framework of CUMULUS that is required to realise the hybrid models and the 
new capabilities of the framework, will be introduced. Also, a hybrid certification model schema 
for realising the security properties to be certified, the architecture of the certification 
infrastructure, and a number of examples of the hybrid certification of security properties, 
follow. 
In the last chapter, the evaluation of my approach is presented. In this chapter, I outline how my 
proposed approach improves certain gaps that arise from the use of popular security certification 
approaches. Also, I introduce a section of conclusions where I evaluate my project and describe 
how it answers the research questions and how it meets its aims and objectives. Finally, the areas 
for future investigation and research, along with my published work, are presented.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Research Methods and evaluation 
The objective of this chapter is to present the relevant literature review and underline the need of 
a hybrid certification approach. For the purposes of this chapter, I reviewed the state of the art 
and the existing approaches in the literature and identified the existing limitations, demonstrating 
how my approach can add value and bridge the existing gaps. First of all, I grouped the 
certification approaches into distinctive categories depending on the kind of certification they 
support, their use and their nature. Additionally, I demonstrated the evolution from service and 
software certification to dynamic certification, where testing is combined with monitoring, 
paving the way for hybrid certification. A comparison between traditional approaches and my 
proposed framework is presented in the end of this chapter, underlying the need for hybrid 
certification mechanisms. The biggest strength of this approach is the fact that a well-rounded 
overview of the existing certification methods and the auditing mechanisms, is identified, giving 
the opportunity to the readers of this report to gain a good understanding about different kinds of 
certification. On the other hand, a limitation of this research method is that there might be 
approaches with limited references that have been escaped my critical review. 
 
2.2 Overview 
Cloud certification is the approach to assess security properties and check one basic set of 
security requirements of an entity, which can be a software artefact, a service or a whole system. 
Cloud service certification is a topic that has gained a lot of ground the last years, as security 
concerns of cloud services arise. The majority of cloud services are complex, making it hard and 
infeasible for individual customers to check their security requirements, so the concept behind a 
certification scheme is to have a security certification scheme check all the security requirements 
for all customers, and, provide sufficient evidence for the validity and assurance of the security 
properties of the entities to be certified, confirming security accountability and liability [41]. 
The certification process of services in the cloud supports users in their decisions coping with all 
issues related to the security and trust in the provision of cloud systems, by having an accredited 
service authority assess the security properties and the underlying security mechanisms, so that 
the users can finally select only the services that are compliant to their requirements or specific 
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privacy frameworks [24]. The content of each certificate depends on the software artefact and 
the security property examined for this artefact, representing all the entities that are involved in 
the certification process, such as the entity making the assertion (i.e. certification authority), the 
software artefact that is being certified (i.e. offered service/platform) and the group of properties 
that need to be certified [43].    
At the moment, there are standard contracts between the customers and the cloud service 
providers, but they do not protect the customers, as sudden and unexpected changes may arise in 
the cloud services. Additionally, the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between the customers 
and the providers represent the contract, which captures the agreed guarantees, but the 
specifications of existing SLAs for cloud services are not designed for flexibly handling the 
performance and the technical requirements of consumer applications [42]. Additionally, SLAs 
usually offer the expected target values for the services offered without addressing the legal risks 
or the operational issues that might appear. Traditional certification schemes consider monolithic 
software components and focus on machine-readable, system-wide certificates to be used at 
deployment and installation times that do not prove to be suitable for service-oriented 
architecture environments, so there is the need for a dynamic certification scheme that manages 
the intrinsic dynamics of services [44]. However, recently, certification has moved to Service 
Oriented Architecture in order to cover the certification of both functional and non-functional 
properties and adapt to new environments [45]. 
At this chapter, I will present the current research and the literature review concerning the 
different kinds of certification and I will focus on the need for a certification-based approach for 
cloud service security. I will take into consideration the emerging audit approaches that are 
based on the logging and reporting of evidence of cloud operations, where certificates are issued 
by certification authorities, who are independent from the cloud service provider and the 
consumers. 
 
2.3 Software and Service Certification 
Software certification is a very popular concept in certification and contains a wide range of 
formal, semi-formal, and informal assurance techniques, requiring several dissimilar 
mechanisms [46]. Recent research has placed much importance on certifying software quality, 
although it is difficult to certify software quality without a measurement framework/environment 
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that simplifies the software quality measurement [47][48].  Software security certification builds 
on existing software assurance, validation, and verification techniques, but introduces the notion 
of explicit software certificates, which contain all the information that is necessary for an 
independent assessment of the certified properties [49]. 
In 1985, the first evaluation criteria appeared in the US under the name “Trusted Computer 
Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)”, which was followed by a similar standard called “The 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)” in Europe in 1991. The four 
countries that formed this standard were UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The U.S. 
Department of Defence created the Trusted Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) standard for 
software security in 1993 [50], which was followed by the Canadian Trusted Computer Product 
Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) security certifications standards [51], but they were both very 
costly as they were national certification schemes. At 1993, the US made an international 
standard for the security evaluation of IT products and established the Federal Criteria (FC) in 
corporation with Canada and presented it in the European Commission. Eventually in 1993, the 
Evaluation Criteria merged the Federal Criteria with its own standard ITSEC and introduced the 
Common Criteria (CC) for the first time [54]. So, the Common Criteria is considered the first 
international software certification standard that appeared, and was developed by the 
governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the U.S. [52]. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the Common Criteria approach is a security standard that 
can achieve comparability between the results of independent security evaluations of IT products 
and requires a comprehensible documentation of the software product, including a detailed threat 
analysis [53]. Common Criteria has two main disadvantages. The first one is the abstraction in 
the IT product evaluation process, and, the second one is the fact that it is a time consuming 
process, so eventually it is a costly process [54]. 
More research in the area of software certification includes a Software Component Certification 
framework, with the objective of acquiring quality in software components. This framework 
adopts the Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach to track the software product proprieties, 
defining a set of metrics to track the properties of the components in a controlled fashion. These 
metrics will help to measure the component properties, the level of the efficiency of the 
certification techniques that are used to evaluate the component characteristics and the reliability 
of the software components [72][73]. 
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In terms of international standards, three international organizations have responsibility for a 
wide range of technology standards: the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
which is an independent, non-governmental membership organization giving world-class 
specifications for products, services and systems to ensure quality, safety and efficiency, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), which is the world’s leading organization for 
the preparation and publication of International Standards for all electrical, electronic and related 
technologies and provides a platform to companies, industries and governments for meeting, 
discussing and developing the International Standards they require and, finally, the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is the United Nation’s specialized agency for 
information and communication technologies (ICT) who developed the technical standards that 
ensure the interconnection between networks and technologies and improved the access to ICTs 
to underserved communities worldwide [56][59][60][61].   
In terms of national standards of software certification, certain countries have standards bodies 
that cover part or the whole standards spectrum [55]. One example is the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI), that developed the procedures that standard developing 
organizations (SDOs) use to develop standards, reviewing also the procedures and processes that 
the SDOs use, and finally approving the standards that SDOs develop to become ANSI standards 
[56]. The Deutsche Institut für Normung (DIN) in Germany is recognized by the German 
government as the official national standards body, representing German interests at the 
international and European levels with responsibility for all standards [56][57]. Additionally, the 
European Community has a regional standards body, which is the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) and supports the standardisation activities in relation to a wide range of 
fields and sectors [58].  
The previous standards and methods are focused on stable and monolithic systems and not on 
dynamic environments, which means that they fail to certify services in the cloud, but paved the 
way for service certification. The wide release of software applications as web services has 
sparked a big interest in the definition of assurance techniques for services, which mostly 
focuses on security [62]. Software certification is, thus, becoming the solution to prove security 
properties [63][64][65], as Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) applications can support the 
dynamic environment of service-based scenarios [66][67], supporting the dynamic changes of 
applications. Each web service has functional, non-functional and behavioural characteristics 
and the three elements that describe it are the following: the Web-Service Description Language 
(WSDL), the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), which is a transport protocol for exchange 
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of information, and the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI), which is a 
registry used to store services [68]. An industry standard execution language that has been 
implemented for specifying the actions within business processes and web services, is the “Web 
Services Business Process Execution Language (WSBPEL)”, which is a standard executable 
language for specifying actions within business processes with web services [69]. 
In service certification, an outcome of a service security certification is a security certificate of a 
service, which is realized by a language that enables the representation of a certificate in a 
structured, machine-processable manner, that enables automated reasoning to be performed on 
them, and, makes it feasible for certified security features to be part of any Service-Oriented 
Computing scenario [74][75]. 
The Assert4SOA EU FP7 project is providing a general service certification framework, notation 
and architecture for supporting certificates in service discovery and composition [70]. The 
Assert4SOA project produces novel techniques and tools that are fully integrated within the 
SOA lifecycle for expressing, assessing and certifying security properties for complex service-
oriented applications, providing a framework for handling Advanced Security Service 
Certificates, called ASSERTs [75][76], but cannot support the certification of cloud services. 
The SERENITY EU FP7 project focuses on providing security and dependability in Ambient 
Intelligence, but the certificate outcomes fail to include information about the verification of the 
service-based systems [71]. Another project that deals with the certification of web services is 
the EU project AVANTSSAR, which proposes a rigorous technology for the formal 
specification and Automated VAlidatioN of Trust and Security of Service-oriented Architectures 
and automates this technology into an integrated toolset (AVANTSSAR Validation Platform). 
[77]. The AVANTSSAR project is a follow-up to the EU AVISPA project, which aims at 
developing a push-button, industrial-strength technology for the analysis of large-scale Internet 
security-sensitive protocols and applications [78]. 
 
2.4 Test based certification  
In service-based environments we need certification schemes that will support the dynamic 
nature of services and can be integrated within the runtime service discovery, selection, and 
composition processes [45]. A lot of research has been made on web services testing and the 
difficulties of automatically generating test cases and assessing the correct functioning of them 
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[79]. This topic has been considered a very popular area of research and investigation, as web 
service testing differs from standard testing, because of the interaction with the service during 
the process. Also, testing is not used for bug-fixing, but for collecting the necessary evidence to 
prove certain security properties. 
Non-functional testing is another area of research covered by several researchers who have 
focused on testing the non-functional characteristics and requirements of software systems 
[81][82][83]. Non-functional testing is used for performing automatic approach based on attack 
scenarios. In non-functional testing, search-based techniques are used to generate the test cases 
that violate the Service Level Agreements and the Quality of Service (QoS) measured when 
executing the service with the generated inputs guides the test [84]. Non-functional testing is of 
great importance, as the QoS of certain functionalities agreed between service providers and 
service consumers might not be met and, also, because the lack of service robustness, or the lack 
of proper recovery actions for unexpected behaviours can cause side effects. One more reason 
underlying the importance of non-functional testing, is the fact that the exposure of services to 
the Internet might lead to security attacks compromising the security of the services [79]. 
However, although non-functional testing is not costly (i.e. the developer does not have to pay 
when testing their own service), non-functional testing isn’t realistic, because it doesn’t account 
for the provider’s and the consumer’s infrastructure, and for the network configuration or load 
[84]. 
Specification-based testing for web services has evolved, as WSDL has been extended to foster 
web service testing, by including input-output dependency, invocation sequence, hierarchical 
functional description, and concurrent sequence specification [85]. Robust testing ensures that 
exceptional behaviour is properly handled and that the service reacts properly to such behaviour, 
but, usually, the error recovery code is not properly tested [79][84][86][87]. There are many 
works about the testing of conformance of the service implementation with its WSDL 
specification [88][89] and others based on symbolic transition system to model and test the web 
service coordination and automatically generate runtime test cases that are applicable to software 
composition [90][91][92][93][94].  
SOA shifted the development perspective from monolithic applications to applications 
composed of services, distributed over the network, developed and hosted by different 
organizations, cooperating together according to a centralized orchestration, making it crucial to 
test services for interoperability, i.e., to perform service integration testing [79]. The area of 
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security certification has been investigated widely, but the existing works focus on providing 
human-readable certificates used at deployment and installation time, failing to support service-
based scenarios [45]. The first attempt to assess and certify the correct functioning of SOA using 
security certificates based on signed test cases was made by Damiani [96] and, later, the U.S.-
based Software Engineering Institute (SEI) defined a web service certification and accreditation 
process for the U.S. Army [97]. The works of Papazoglou and Ryu discuss the problem of 
managing evolving services that are subject to dynamic changes and variations, introducing the 
need of continuous redesign and refinement of services, as service evolution may in fact 
invalidate the certificate awarded to a service, thus triggering recertification [66][67][84].  
The Quality of Service of web services has been researched by Al-Moayed and Hollunder [97] 
and a novel QoS model, that aims to perform flexible service selection by relaxing clients QoS 
preferences, has been proposed [84][98].  Concerning SLA testing, it is worth mentioning that 
SLA testing deals with the need for identifying conditions for which a service cannot be able to 
prove its functionality with a desired level of SLA [79]. An approach has been proposed by Di 
Penta for SLA testing of atomic and composite services using Genetic Algorithms (GAs), 
according to which GAs generate combinations of inputs and bindings for the service-centric 
system causing SLA violations [79]. 
Statistical testing has also been used for the certification of web services. In statistical testing, a 
model is developed to characterize the population of uses of the software, and the model is used 
to generate a statistically correct sample of all uses of the software [102]. In statistical testing, a 
software “usage model” characterizes the population of intended uses of the software in the 
intended environment and testing, based on a software usage model ensures that the failures that 
will occur most frequently in operational use will be found early in the testing cycle. The usage 
model is based on the software specification [102]. Statistical Testing addresses the problem of 
determining feasible sub-sets of test cases, while maintaining at the same time adequate and 
sufficient test coverage [103][104][105]. The purpose of statistical testing is to predict the 
reliability of the test object. Statistical testing is used to measure the reliability and the quality 
assurance of a software system and web services, as it helps testers prioritise testing effort based 
on usage scenarios, frequencies for individual web resources and navigation patterns to ensure 
the reliability of web applications [103]. The usage models are represented via Markov chains. 
Usage models are built from specifications of the system, by user guides and by observing the 
user interactions with the existing software. Test cases (i.e. paths through the usage models) are 
generated from the model taking into consideration the transition probabilities. The next step is 
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to statistically analyse the results of the tests in order to determine the expected reliability of the 
system [106]. In general, statistical testing uses a formal experimental paradigm for random 
testing according to a usage model of software [107]. The biggest advantage of statistical testing 
is that the model helps us to determine a feasible sub-set of test cases. Statistical testing also 
guarantees that the failures that occur most frequently in operational use will be found early in 
the testing cycle. However, statistical testing cannot be used for establishing confidence in 
predicting that a special failure, which has been uncovered in one service-based application 
instance, could also occur in other instances. Furthermore, it requires a very high number of test 
cases to produce statistical sound data, it may not thoroughly test the software’s ability to handle 
exceptional conditions and, on average, the most frequently used operations receive the most 
testing [104][107][108]. 
As for dynamic testing, Foster has proposed a run-time certification and compliance mechanism 
combining static and dynamic model-checking techniques with event monitoring and violation 
detection, but without reference to cloud computing, focusing only on SOA environment and not 
considering multi-tenancy, location independency and on-demand provisioning [33]. 
Additionally, Kuo et al. implemented a dynamic risk assessment mechanism using SaaS web 
service, but the proposed mechanism is designed for internal use in organizations in order to help 
security managers realise the security awareness and vulnerability assessment in end-client 
devices [100]. 
Regardless of the test method, testing a service-centric system requires the invocation of actual 
services on the provider’s machine and, this leads to several drawbacks, such as prohibitive costs 
for the users if they have to pay for services on a pay-per-use basis, massive testing that can 
cause a denial-of-service phenomenon for service providers and high bandwidth use [84]. For 
these reasons, dynamic testing of web services that will take into account the dynamic nature of 
web services combined with monitoring techniques is needed. One testing strategy that is 
suitable for testing service-based applications has been introduced [117]. According to this 
strategy, changes are captured at the service interface and the system is able to identify changes 
that occur in service operations and operational arguments in a service description of a test 
candidate, and the architecture is able to respond to responds to changes of service operation, 
operation arguments and service composition changes [117]. 
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2.5 Cloud services certification 
The certification of cloud services presents a number of challenges, related to the complexity of 
a scenario where different service delivery models are offered in dynamic environments. One 
challenge is the fact that the freedom of choice given by dynamic software provisioning on the 
cloud needs to be suitably reconciled with the apparently conflicting requirement of verifying 
that software systems have the appropriate assurance levels for the intended purpose. Also, 
influential security guidelines mandate users to check at the time of use that software systems 
hold the desired set of security properties [24]. 
In cloud services, the assurance evidence is collected by a wide range of formal, semi-formal, 
and informal evaluation methods, including formal verification of compliance to policies, system 
simulation, testing and monitoring [24]. It should be mentioned that security certification 
criteria, such as Common Criteria (ISO 15408) evaluate third-party software and provide a 
widely adopted practical solution to address the trust of cloud services [35], but these criteria are 
based only on testing and fails to certify security properties that require continuous monitoring, 
such as the data-integrity-at-rest security property, as defined in [160]. 
Also, ISO/IEC 27002 provides best practice recommendations on information security 
management for use by those responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining 
information security management systems (ISMS) [32], but does not support the constant 
provision of information about the security of cloud services, failing to certify security properties 
that require continuous monitoring, such as the data-alteration-detection security property, as 
defined in [160]. Dhiyanesh and Thiyagarajan have focused on third party auditability in cloud 
storage systems via simultaneous integrity check in order to ensure cloud data storage security, 
but they do not mention anything about the certification process [109]. Additionally, a 
framework has been produced for secure cloud computing through IT auditing using checklists, 
but it does focus on the certification process [110]. Risk Assessment-as-a-service has been 
introduced to enable the evaluation of security risks in the cloud environment [111], but is only 
focused on the risks associated with security. A ComCert approach for automated compliance 
certification of cloud-based business processes has been proposed, but it only focuses on 
regulatory requirements and not on automated certification [112]. Providing security assurance 
through IT audits has been the norm in industrial practice, but, IT audits focus on providing 
guidelines for inspection of security controls on IT and cloud infrastructures, and, they are not 
automated [110][113]. Testing has been also used to develop a test based security certification 
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scheme for cloud services, but fail to certify security properties that require continuous 
monitoring such as the data-integrity-at-rest security property [39][160]. 
The TRUSTe EU Safe Harbor Seal Program is a European Program that verifies the compliance 
with the Safe Harbor Framework, including alternative dispute resolution, and helps 
organizations to get ready for self-certification with the U.S. Department of Commerce. The 
“TRUSTed Cloud Privacy Certification”, but focuses only on certifying the privacy 
functionalities supported by service providers [114]. 
 
2.6 Monitoring based certification 
Monitoring observes services or service-based applications during their actual use or operation 
[118][119]. Monitoring can provide statements about a service-based application’s current 
execution and can uncover failures which have escaped testing, because the concrete input that 
lead to the current execution trace might have not been covered by any test case [118], in 
contrast to testing which aims at providing more general statements about services or service-
based applications [120]. With monitoring, run-time verification is enabled and we can easily 
determine if the current execution preserves specified properties [118]. Generally, a monitor is a 
system that observes the behaviour of a system and determines if it is consistent with a given 
specification, by taking an executing software system and a specification of software properties 
and checking that the execution meets the properties. Monitoring is concerned with actual 
transitions between states, and not with possible transitions [118][121].  
According to existing monitoring approaches, there are different techniques used, ranging from 
monitoring service compositions and workflows to monitoring infrastructures for serviced-based 
systems, monitoring individual software services and monitoring cloud services. Concerning 
cloud monitoring, the most widely covered topic is performance monitoring 
[125][126][127][128][130][131]. A configurable cloud certification framework allowing the 
definition and realisation of different monitoring based cloud certification models, is described 
in [37], in addition to systems that support cloud security monitoring [135][136][137]. With 
monitoring, cloud incidents can be detected by different key points of cloud infrastructure such 
as VMs of cloud users and data storage components [136][137].  Additionally, systems that 
support the monitoring of network level metrics and the detection of SLA violations have been 
developed [131][132][133]. The EVEREST EU FP7 Project is an open source system supporting 
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the monitoring of security properties of software and cloud services, including basic security 
properties such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and the application of appropriate 
access controls at different layers [37]. At a hypervisor level, monitoring can provide incident 
detection, even if monitoring agents are not able to communicate with monitoring systems, as 
happens in the Amazon’s CloudWatch case [138].  
According to the existing state of the art, monitoring fails to support the certification of cloud 
services, as there are vulnerabilities in the provision of cloud services that are related to breaches 
of integrity, confidentiality and privacy due to multi-tenancy of services, interference between 
security mechanisms at different layers in the cloud stack and interference between security and 
cloud virtualisation and optimisation, as well as the dependences between services at different 
layers in the cloud and their potential dynamic evolution [1][9][31]. It is necessary that 
monitoring is continuous. There are existing methods that focus on systems with a stable 
structure operating under stable conditions [15]. Dynamic configuration of the monitoring 
infrastructure have been introduced in [144] in order to provide uninterrupted monitoring 
services when the monitoring capabilities that are available in a service based system and/or 
cloud infrastructure change as a result of dynamic changes in the constituent services of such 
systems. The on-going certification of cloud services is presented in [39][44][62], where there 
are references about the certification of cloud-based systems whose conditions can change 
dynamically, but ignore platform services and the infrastructure involved in the cloud service 
provision. In terms of international standards, NIST’s SCAP specifications and Cloud Security 
Alliance’s Cloud Trust Protocol provide interfaces for extracting monitoring data from clouds 
[25][145].   
 
2.7 Dynamic certification 
The notion of dynamic certification, where testing is combined with monitoring to provide 
security certifications of cloud services, is at a very early stage. An approach based on service 
monitoring and statistical testing has been proposed for the certification of web services. In this 
approach, monitoring data is augmented with results from online testing to make failure 
predictions with confidence [108]. Kuo et al. propose and implement a dynamic risk assessment 
mechanism using Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) web services, but the proposed mechanism is 
designed for internal use in organizations in order to help security managers realize the security 
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awareness and vulnerability assessment in end client devices [115]. Additionally, monitoring has 
also been combined with model checking techniques to assess properties of software cloud 
services [33], by combining static and dynamic model-checking techniques with event 
monitoring and violation detection, but there is no reference to cloud computing. The only 
reference is to SOA environments. 
A dynamic approach has been proposed in [16]. This approach is based on standards like the 
Cloud Control matrix by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA CCM), the International Organisation 
for Standardisation  (ISO) 27001/27017, the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) SP800-53 and the EuroCloud Audit questionnaire, focusing on the continuous 
monitoring of critical parameters of cloud services and data centre organization, on automation 
of the certification/evaluation process, and on appropriate technical, organizational, legal, and 
economic conditions for the integration of the dynamic certification into the regular operations 
of cloud. According to this approach, customers of cloud services can be constantly informed 
about the actual security and quality state, as well as the compliance with the requirements of the 
certification, when continuous monitoring and automation is applied to the certification process 
[116], but this approach does not include testing techniques. 
The CUMULUS EU FP7 Project has proposed one more dynamic approach. CUMULUS aims 
to address the cloud limitations by developing an integrated framework of models, processes and 
tools supporting the certification of security properties of infrastructure (IaaS), platform (PaaS) 
and software application layer (SaaS) services in cloud. CUMULUS framework brings service 
users, service providers and cloud suppliers to work together with certification authorities in 
order to ensure security certificate validity in the ever-changing cloud environment [117]. 
 
2.8 Current Approaches and comparison between traditional and dynamic 
certificate models 
There are several research works in the area of cloud security and many security certification 
schemes that are currently used. The most famous is the accepted worldwide ISO 27001 for 
security audit, which provides best practice recommendations on information security 
management for use by those responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining 
information security management systems (ISMS) [24][57][59]. At the same time, security 
certification criteria, such as Common Criteria (CC), provide a widely adopted practical solution 
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to address the trust deficit when evaluating and purchasing third-party software [24]. One more 
solution proposed for certifying cloud services is the Security, Trust and Assurance Registry 
(STAR) self-assessment certification framework developed by CSA [146], which is requesting 
from solution providers, non-profit organisations and individuals to enter into discussion about 
the current and future best practices for information assurance in the cloud. This framework is 
based on the Open Certification Framework (OCF) structured by three levels of trust [27]. 
However, the STAR self-assessment certification framework is only limited to monitoring. The 
Cloud Standards web site is collecting and coordinating information about cloud-related 
standards under development by the groups [147]. The Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) maintains a list of top vulnerabilities to cloud-based or SaaS models which is updated 
since the threat landscape changes [148]. The Open Grid Forum publishes documents about 
security and infrastructural specifications, along with information for grid computing developers 
and researchers [149].  
The Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) developed by CSA contains a comprehensive set of controls 
to assess the information security assurance in clouds, and maps controls to existing frameworks.  
The CCM has been developed through the Open Certification Framework (OCM). The CCM 
provides a framework of controls that gives detailed understanding of security concepts and 
principles that are aligned to the CSA guidance in 13 domains [150]. The Cloud Audit protocol, 
also developed by CSA provides an automated query interface to cloud services for audit [151]. 
The EuroCloud Star Audit is a certification scheme for cloud providers that creates more 
transparency in the market and helps businesses find the right services for their cloud projects 
[152]. Additionally, ENISA’s Cloud Computing Information Assurance Framework [9], along 
with the Security Recommendations For Cloud Providers by German Federal Office for 
Information Security (BSI) [154] and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) [153], represent current audit frameworks, but they offer limited 
degree of automation and do not provide continuous monitoring. Furthermore, the Operationally 
Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) method is an approach used to 
assess an organization's information security needs, focusing on information assets, where an 
organisation's important assets are identified and assessed, based on the information assets to 
which they are connected [155]. The previous certification approaches presented fail to support 
automated and continuous certification of security properties of cloud services and prove to have 
several limitations. For that reason, they cannot deliver the high level of assurance required for 
issuing certificates that guarantee the security of services. 
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At this point, a comparison between hybrid and traditional certification of cloud services is 
presented. Traditional approaches for certifying security properties rely on manual inspections 
and audits, proving to be static, inflexible, non-automated and unable to realise the economic 
dimension that the Cloud entails [16]. As already stated, the STAR self-assessment certification 
framework allows cloud providers to submit self-assessment reports, when fully implemented 
[27]. The CCM facilitates regulatory compliance and provides organizations with the needed 
structure, detail and clarity relating to information security tailored to the cloud industry. It is 
also specifically designed to provide fundamental security principles to guide cloud vendors and 
to assist prospective cloud customers in assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider, 
integrating the ISO/IEC 27001 management systems standard, but CCM is human-centric, 
requiring from the companies that adopt it to address the issues that they define critical 
concerning cloud security and to pre-assess the level of maturity of their systems. The CCM 
enables the integration, monitoring and management of cloud services through a framework that 
can take care of the elementary issues regarding cloud security, but it does not support 
certification as an automated service in the cloud [27][157]. 
Traditional certification models (i.e. ISO/IEC 27001, NIST) also require manual inspections and 
are unable to provide the required level of assurance in cloud computing and to fit the dynamic 
nature of the cloud, focusing on monolithic software components and failing to address on-
demand self-service, dynamic allocation of resources and multi-tenancy [16][17][24]. 
Additionally, traditional certification models lack in trust, transparency and accuracy, as they do 
not support the constant provision of information about the security of cloud services, unlike my 
hybrid approach that relies on continuous monitoring and testing and it is focused on cloud 
services. Security auditing approaches that provide security assurance focus on providing 
guidelines and are not automated [110][113]. One more drawback is that they require that the 
consumers rely on third-party auditors for security assurance. Common Criteria (CC) 
certification uses Evaluation Technical Reports [75]. Consumers can specify their requirements 
in a document called “Protection Profile” (CC-PP), and vendors can build products that conform 
to a CC-PP, but automation is not supported [158]. A PP defines an implementation-independent 
set of IT security requirements for a category of properties [159]. However, CC has a human-
centric approach, which is not designed to support automated security certification, targeting 
static, monolithic systems and requiring a large investment of resources. Also, traditional CC 
certification does not focus on activities that can be automated, but considers analysing 
documental evidence provided by the developer.  
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Compared to non-hybrid models for certifying availability, the hybrid model I will introduce can 
produce availability assessments of higher confidence as the monitoring and testing evidence can 
be cross-checked before being used in an assessment (and certificate) and can both be included 
in a certificate depending on the chosen validation checks. Hybrid models offer also a more 
extended pool of evidence and possibilities to decide which data are relevant and of sufficient 
quality, so that they can be taken into consideration for issuing a hybrid certificate. Apart from 
increasing the confidence level of assessments, hybrid models are also more customisable than 
traditional certification models, since they offer the choice of deciding how test and monitoring 
evidence should be correlated, cross-checked and used in assessments. 
 
2.9 Trustworthiness and security cloud certification 
In this section, I will outline how security in cloud certification is related to trustworthiness. First 
of all, trustworthiness in cloud services is considered a very big concern, as trustworthiness is 
often compromised due to lack of control over the underlying infrastructure when data resides in 
the cloud. When it comes to selecting cloud services, cloud providers and cloud consumers do 
not have sufficient knowledge about each other, and this leads to uncertainty because of an 
implied established level of trust from the side of the cloud consumers, who expect that the 
adopted cloud services will fulfil their needs and requirements [171]. Trustworthiness represents 
the perceived level of confidence that data from a resource and, therefore, the particular resource 
itself, have not been compromised. Determining these aspects is hard due to the dependencies 
between pieces of data, potential changes in data and resources over time, and the fact that 
resources potentially conspire with each other [182].  
 
The most popular techniques for selecting cloud services include static descriptions and 
reputation of these services, not taking into consideration other trust factors, thus, making in it 
difficult to compare the trustworthiness of cloud services, as it is quite expensive and time-
consuming to evaluate trustworthiness, and, also, there is not a universally accepted standardised 
metric system for the trustworthiness evaluation [171][172]. However, the concept of 
trustworthiness is very generic and there are several aspects that need to be evaluated when we 
assess the trustworthiness of cloud services. 
 
 
 33 
 
Transparency of providers’ practices, capacities and processes help to generate evidence-based 
confidence that everything that is claimed to be happening in the cloud is indeed happening as 
described and certifications can support this evidence-based confidence, by providing an interesting 
channel between end-users and service providers, allowing users internal observations of cloud 
service operations [179][181]. Concerning the trust evaluation models that have been developed, 
Zhou and Hwang have implemented a PowerTrust model to calculate peer reputation, based on 
trust scores and on a trust overlay network, where peers in the network rate each other after 
transactions as their local trust [173]. The PowerTrust model evolved into a GossipTrust model 
that addressed the limitations of the previous work, and is based on a gossip method to aggregate 
peers’ global reputation [174]. A4Cloud combines risk analysis risk analysis, policy 
enforcement, monitoring auditing and compliance auditing, providing methods and tools to 
enable transparency and legal, regulatory and socio-economic policy enforcement, to make 
stakeholders accountable for the privacy and confidentiality of information held in the cloud 
[171][175]. Additionally, a Trust Management Framework for differentiating trustworthy cloud 
services and for protecting cloud consumers, has been introduced by Cloud Armor. This 
framework relies on decentralized architecture and rates the credibility of cloud services, by 
using the cloud consumer’s perspective and feedback collections and by offering 
recommendations and feedback to cloud consumer about cloud services [171][176][177]. 
Moreover, there are certain existing schemes that support self-certification, such as the Cloud 
Industry Forum (CIF), IT-Grundschutz, Leet and NIST SP800-144 and others that support third-
party assessment, such as EuroCloud, Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), ISO, 
Leet, Service Organisation Control (SOC) 1-2-3, McAfee, and TUV, and others that support both 
self-certification and third-party assessment, such as CSA [178][179]. It is worth mentioning that 
self-certification fails to provide objective assessment-based trust judgements, as first-time service 
consumers usually do not trust the information about the attributes of a cloud service, casting doubts 
on the sources of the attribute assessment [178]. 
 
Trustworthy sources of attribute assessment include cloud auditors, accreditors or certifiers [179]. 
NIST has identified a cloud auditor as a party that can conduct independent assessment of cloud 
services, information system operations, performance, and security of a cloud implementation, 
evaluating the services provided by a cloud provider in terms of security controls, privacy impact, 
performance, but, for certain end-users, even the trustworthiness of a cloud auditor, accreditor and 
certifier needs to be evaluated by looking into their own attributes and/or policies, requiring a 
certification authority to accredit and monitor the certifiers [179][180]. These transparency 
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mechanisms provide channels for cloud users to “observe” how cloud service providers operate and 
help to establish trust by making the cloud services more “visible”, resulting in increased confidence 
in services and providers’ competency, integrity and goodwill [179]. Monitoring SLAs and the 
quality of standards can play an important role to trust verification, as it provides additional evidence 
about the trustee’s competency, integrity, and goodwill, while testing can provide tools and 
continuous testing processes for compliance with the scheme requirements [179]. 
My research and contribution in hybrid cloud services certification focuses on providing enhanced 
security when certifying services in the cloud, and not on increasing the trustworthiness of cloud 
services. The confidence level of trust is relative and changes over time. Assessing the 
trustworthiness of cloud resources is hard because of the complexity involved in managing the 
individual resources and in determining trust relationships [182]. However, it can be implied that 
increased security can lead to increased trustworthiness in service certification. Nevertheless, as 
trustworthiness is based on several subjective factors, such as the trust of the cloud consumer to the 
services offered by the cloud provider, increased security does not always lead to increased 
trustworthiness. 
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3. The Hybrid Certification Approach 
3.1 Research methods and evaluation 
The objective of this chapter is to present the hybrid certification approach that I propose, 
covering the gaps that arise from the use of existing certification approaches. For that reason, 
firstly, I reviewed the existing framework that is used in the CUMULUS project and I analysed 
its strengths and limitations. This gave me the opportunity to identify the existing gaps of that 
framework. More specifically, the gaps in the testing and monitoring certification model 
schemas for realising the cloud properties led me to focus on developing a powerful hybrid 
certification model schema that will realise these properties and will be able to bridge the 
aforementioned gaps. So, a hybrid certification language was formed to cover the gaps arising 
from testing and monitoring certification. Certain elements of the framework of CUMULUS 
project that fit the hybrid purposes have been modified and redesigned, whereas other elements 
have been designed from scratch and are newly introduced in this chapter. After the description 
of the hybrid approach, I present the architecture of the certification infrastructure that is an 
extension of the CUMULUS architecture and I outline a number of examples that demonstrate 
the hybrid certification of cloud security properties. Thus, I selected certain security properties 
that fail to be certified by other certification approaches, in order to show how my hybrid 
solution certifies security properties that other approaches fail to certify. The biggest strength of 
this approach is that the existing gaps of the CUMULUS framework are identified and an 
advanced framework is proposed. However, the biggest limitation of this method is the fact that 
my approach is focused on addressing the needs of the CUMULUS EU FP7 Project, and fails to 
support multi-layer hybrid certification. Admittedly, this could be an area of investigation for 
future work.  
 
3.2 Overview 
Hybrid certification combines evidence gathered through testing and monitoring to collect the 
elements that are required to certify a security property. The hybrid approach that I present 
overcomes the limitations of each on of the individual certification processes (i.e. testing or 
monitoring in isolation).  Continuous monitoring allows the non-stop observation of the system 
without interfering with it, but can insufficient in certain cases, as it can make the verification 
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infeasible. For example, monitoring requires testing agents to verify signatures and inject traffic. 
On the other hand, testing can be powerful in pre-production environments, but on live systems 
it can interfere with business operations. For these reason, I decided to introduce an approach 
that will be based on the combination of testing and monitoring. 
My work on hybrid security certification is part of the CUMULUS EU FP7 Project, which 
focuses on continuous, multiple evidence and multi-layer cloud service security certification. In 
CUMULUS, certification is a process that is carried out according to a certification model [165]. 
This model defines: (i) the security property to be certified, (ii) the cloud service that this 
property applies to (aka target of certification (TOC)), (iii) the evidence that should be used to 
assess the property, (iv) the conditions that determine the sufficiency of evidence for issuing a 
certificate for the property, and (v) ways to treat conflicts in the evidence.  
In my approach, the certification process is a function that takes as input certain assertions about 
a security property and a target of certification and produces as an output a machine-readable 
certificate that contains evidence that prove the security property. The evidence is collected 
through testing and monitoring. Testing can be offline or online. In offline testing, the collected 
evidence show that a test has been performed on the cloud software and that a specific result has 
been produced. In online testing, only when a specific service is invoked, then the tests are 
carried out. Monitoring is continuous, so the monitoring evidence required for assessing the 
security properties is acquired through continuous monitoring. 
The certification process starts when a service provider makes a request to the certification 
authority. This certification process is driven by certification models that define the security 
property to be certified, the evidence that needs to be collected, the way the different bodies of 
evidence will be correlated, the lifecycle of the certificates and, finally, the involved agents that 
have the responsibility for this process. When enough evidence for verifying a security property 
is collected, then a certificate is issued. The certificate is an instance of this security property. 
More specifically, the certification model schema defines the security property that needs to be 
certified, the types and the extent of evidence that need to be collected for the certification of the 
property, the ways the consistency of the evidence is checked, the way further exploration will 
take place in the event of inconsistencies between the gathered evidence and, how the 
certification decisions will be made. It also provides an assessment scheme that is responsible 
for defining the evidence that will be used for the assessment of the security property and for 
specifying the evidence consistency conditions. When the evidence is collected, then my 
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proposed model will compare the different types of evidence and will perform the cross-
checking. If the results gathered from testing and monitoring comply with each other, and if 
enough evidence for issuing a certificate is collected (sufficiency conditions satisfied), then a 
hybrid certificate is issued. Certificates need to be updated, as the operational conditions of the 
cloud service might change. 
The definition of hybrid certificates is realised through an XML schema for specifying the 
elements needed for generating the hybrid certificates. The XML schema supports the definition 
of executable certification models that can be used to drive the certification process and generate 
certificates. 
 
3.3 Background 
CUMULUS offers a monitoring infrastructure for realising monitoring based certification 
models based on EVEREST [37]. EVEREST enables the monitoring of runtime events produced 
by distributed systems based on rules and assumptions expressed in an Event Calculus based 
language, called EC-Assertion [37]. Rules express conditions that must be satisfied at all times 
by runtime events, whilst assumptions express the ways of deducing information from such 
events (e.g. the state of the monitored system). Both rules and assumptions are defined in terms 
of events and fluents. An event is something that occurs at a specific instance of time and has 
instantaneous duration. Fluents represent system states and are initiated and terminated by 
events. The basic predicates used by EC-Assertion are: 
• Happens(e,t,[L,U]) – This predicate denotes that an event e of instantaneous duration 
occurs at some time point t within the time range [L,U]. An event e is specified as 
e(_id,_snd,_rcv,TP,_sig,_src) where _id is its unique id of it, _snd is its sender, _rcv is its 
receiver, _sig is its signature, and _src is the source where e was captured from.  TP is 
the event’s type. EC-Assertion offers three built-in event types: (a) captured operation 
calls (REQ), (b) captured operation responses (RES) and (c) forced operation execution 
events (EXC), i.e., operation executions triggered by the monitor itself.  
• Initiates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is initiated by an event e at time t. 
• Terminates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is terminated by an event e at 
time t. 
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• HoldsAt(f,t) – This is a derived predicate denoting that a fluent f holds at time t. 
HoldsAt(f,t) is true if f has been initiated by some event at some time point t’ before t and 
has not been terminated by any event within [t’,t]. 
Concerning the testing mechanisms, CUMULUS offers a distinction between offline/static 
testing when test cases are performed in a pre-production cloud environment which is a 
replication of the in production cloud and online/dynamic testing when test cases are executed in 
production environments periodically when a specific event occurs or when specific conditions 
are met. 
 
3.4 Description of Hybrid Certification Models (dependent-mode & independent-
mode) 
The key concept underpinning a hybrid certification model is the need to have both testing and 
monitoring types of evidence, as none of them would be sufficient in isolation for certifying a 
given property. One very important aspect is the cross-checking of evidence regarding the 
assessment of a security property that have been gathered from testing and monitoring and, 
provided that there is no conflict within the evidence, to combine it providing assurance for 
properties. Consider, for example, a scenario where the property to be certified is cloud service 
availability. If availability is measured as the percentage of the calls to service operations for 
which a response was produced with a given time period d, a monitoring check should verify 
that responses are produced within the required time limit. However, the trace of service calls 
that has been examined by the monitoring process might not cover all the operations in the 
service interface. In such cases, before issuing a certificate for service availability, it would be 
necessary to test any of the above service usage conditions that have not been covered yet.  
The combination of monitoring and testing can be attempted in two basic modes:  
(1) The dependent mode – In this mode, a security property is assessed for a TOC 
by a primary form of assessment (monitoring or testing) which triggers the other 
(subordinate) form in order to confirm and/or complete the evidence required for 
the assessment. More specifically, when not enough evidence is gathered by one 
form of assessment, or when we just want to confirm the evidence gathered, then 
the certification mode will trigger the collection of evidence from the other form 
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of assessment so that enough evidence will be acquired to proceed with the 
certification process. 
For example, let us suppose that we want to assess data integrity-at-rest security 
property. As defined in [160], this property expresses the ability to detect and 
report any alteration of stored data in a target of certification (TOC). With 
monitoring we can capture requests for an update operation and the relevant 
responses to them, along with the existence of events that show the call of an 
operation to notify the receipt and execution of the update request. However, we 
cannot capture updates of data that might have been carried out without using the 
update interface assumed. For this reason, the hybrid model will be based on 
periodic testing to detect if stored data have been modified and monitor the 
periods between the tests that revealed data modifications to check if appropriate 
notifications have also been sent. In this case, both types of evidence will be 
combined. Data modifications could be detected by obtaining the hash value of 
the relevant data file in the TOC periodically. 
(2) The independent mode – In this mode, a security property is assessed for a TOC 
by both monitoring and testing independently without any of these assessments 
being triggered by outcomes of the other. Then at specific points defined by the 
evidence sufficiency conditions of the certification model the two bodies of 
evidence are correlated and cross-checked to complete the hybrid assessment. 
The evidence is collected through independent tests and through monitoring that 
take place in parallel.  
Let us suppose that we are going to assess the availability security property. As 
defined in [160], this property expresses the percentage of successful requests 
processed by the TOC over the total number of submitted requests and is 
measured by the percentage of calls that satisfy this condition over an assessment 
period. An independent hybrid model for the certification of TOC availability 
could be based on collecting evidence regarding the availability of a TOC through 
monitoring and testing independently (i.e., without any of these activities being 
triggered by outcomes of the other) and then correlating and cross-checking the 
evidence. 
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A non-hybrid certification model includes all the elements required for the certification of a 
security property and is used to specify the security property that needs to be certified, it 
provides the formal definition of the security property (assertion) and describes the elements that 
refer to the monitoring and test-based certificates.  In addition to what a non-hybrid CUMULUS 
certification model defines, a hybrid certification model will define: (a) the mode of hybrid 
certification; (b) the way of correlating and analysing monitoring and testing evidence; (c) 
conditions for characterising these types of evidence as conflicting, and (d) the way in which a 
final overall assessment of the property can be generated based on both types of evidence. 
 
3.5 Hybrid certification model schema description 
In the following section, I will provide a more detailed description of the hybrid certification 
model schema. The schema is based on collecting evidence to certify the availability of a TOC 
through monitoring and testing, and then, on correlating and cross-checking the evidence 
collected. The hybrid certification model schema will be based on the test-based certification 
model schema and on the monitoring-based certification model schema that have been 
developed for CUMULUS and are defined in [166][167].  
For that reason, the test-based and the monitoring-based certification model schemas will be 
presented, and the elements of these schemas that have been used or refined in the hybrid 
schema will be explained. Moreover, the new elements that have been added to the hybrid 
schema will be introduced and described thoroughly. Finally, a table summarising all the 
elements of the hybrid certification model will be provided, and then, a detailed description of 
the hybrid certification model schema will follow. In this table, I explain which elements are 
new and which already-existing elements have been refined to fit the hybrid purposes. 
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Test-based Certification Model Schema 
The Test-based Certification Model Schema presented below shows the fundamental artefacts 
deriving from the model for Static/Offline and Dynamic/Online Test-based Certification (Figure 
1). This model is part of the CUMULUS project. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Test-based Certification Model schema 
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Monitoring-based Certification Model Schema 
The Monitoring-based Certification Model Schema is presented below (Figure 2). This model is 
part of the CUMULUS project. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Monitoring-based Certification Model Schema 
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The testing and monitoring certification model schemas developed for the CUMULUS project 
have certain limitations. More specifically, the test-based certification model schema does not 
include an element to specify explicitly the interfaces that are provided or required for the 
assessment of the TOC. Also, the test-based certification model schema does not include an 
element concerning the expiration time of the evidence collected for the assessment of the 
security properties and does not define a state transition model that can drive the mechanisms 
behind the lifecycle element that are required when the certificate moves from one state to 
another. On the other hand, the monitoring-based certification model schema defines different 
states than the ones defined in the lifecycle element in the test-based certification model schema 
and uses a different way of defining the TOC and the security properties to be certified. To 
overcome the above problems and limitations, a new certification model had to be defined that 
can be applied when certifying security properties for cloud services and evidence are collected 
through monitoring and testing. So, elements from both certification model schemas were used 
in order to have a common way of certifying security properties when monitoring and testing are 
performed. At this point, I will present the top layer of the hybrid certification model schema 
that I proposed for hybrid certification is presented below (Figure 3). The elements of the hybrid 
certification model schema will be thoroughly described below. 
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Figure 3 - Hybrid Certification Model Schema 
The following table summarises the elements of the hybrid certification model schema and the 
correspondences between the test-based and the monitoring-based certification model schemas 
already developed. Furthermore, the following table demonstrates which elements of the 
CUMULUS framework have been used and modified to fit the hybrid purposes and which 
elements are newly introduced.  
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Hybrid based 
Certification 
model 
Description 
Model Id Represents the unique identifier of the certification model instance. This element was 
included in the Monitoring-based certification model schema and has been used for my 
approach, as it fits the hybrid purposes. 
Signature Represents the digital signature of the certification authority that has defined or 
advocated the certification model. This element was included in the Monitoring-based 
certification model schema and has been used for my approach, as it fits the hybrid 
purposes. 
TOC Describes the cloud service to be certified by the particular instance of the certification 
model. For the hybrid schema, elements from the Test-based and the Monitoring-based 
certification model schemas have been used and refined to form this element.  
Security 
Property 
 
Defines the Security Property, which has to be certified by the Certification Model 
instance. Security properties are specified through one or more formal assertions. For 
the hybrid certification model schema, I have used the SecurityProperty element from 
the Monitoring-based certification model schema as it fits the hybrid purposes. 
Collectors 
Evidence 
Aggregation 
Defines how evidence will be collected and aggregated. This element contains sub-
elements of the Collectors element from the Test-based certification model schema and 
sub-elements of the MonitoringConfigurations element and EvidenceAggregation 
elements of the Monitoring-based certification model schema, which have been refined 
to fit the hybrid purposes. 
Lifecycle 
Model 
Defines the basic stages in the generation and management of the certificates. The 
LifecycleModel element from the Monitoring-based certification model schema has 
been used, but refined to fit the hybrid purposes. 
Assessment 
Scheme 
The core metrics and conditions regarding the assessment of the property to be 
certified are formally expressed through the assertion(s) included in the definition of 
this property. The AssessmentScheme element specifies the evidence sufficiency 
conditions, the expiration conditions and the TriggerDecisionCondition element. The 
EvidenceSufficiencyConditions and ExpirationConditions elements from the 
Monitoring-based certification model schema have been used and refined to fit the 
hybrid purposes. The TriggerDecisionCondition element is new. 
Cross-check Defines the conditions for cross-checking evidence collected from testing and 
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Hybrid based 
Certification 
model 
Description 
Scheme monitoring. This element also contains the deviation conditions and further exploration 
conditions when more evidence is required for issuing a certificate. This element is 
new.  
Table 1- Elements of the Hybrid Certification Model Schema and correspondence with previous 
Schemas 
 
3.5.1 Model Id element 
The Model_Id element, as shown in Figure 4, is the element in the schema that represents the 
unique identifier of the certification model instance. Model_Id is an element of type string. This 
element was included in the Monitoring-based certification model schema and has been used in 
the Hybrid Certification model schema as it fits the hybrid purposes. An example of this element 
in XML is shown below. 
<Model_Id>cumulus:cm:id:hybrid:00001</Model_Id>	
 
The identifier of the certification model is different from the identifier of an instance of the 
model that is used when the model is applied, in order to certify a given property of a particular 
TOC. 
 
Figure 4 - Model Id element 
 
3.5.2 Signature element 
The Signature element, as shown in Figure 5, is the element in the schema that represents the 
digital signature of the certification authority and is an element of type string. This element was 
included in the Monitoring-based certification model schema and has been used in the Hybrid 
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Certification model schema, as it fits the Hybrid purposes. An example of the Signature element 
in XML is shown below.  
<Signature>		
						<Name>CUMULUS_City</Name>								
						<Role>Certifier</Role>		
<Signature>		
 
 
Figure 5 - Signature element 
 
3.5.3 TOC element 
The TOC (TargetOfCertification) element describes the cloud service to be certified by a 
particular instance of the certification model, as shown in Figure 6. The TOC element allows the 
definition of the interfaces provided by the cloud stack that need to be further analysed. For the 
hybrid schema, elements from both testing and monitoring schemas have been used. The TOC is 
an element of type TOCType. This element includes an attribute, called “Id”, which represents 
the unique identifier of the TOC and is an attribute generated by the framework, in order to 
guarantee the alignment for Test-based and Monitoring-based Certification Model (CM) 
instances. The other sub-elements are: the ConcreteToc sub-element that contains a description 
about the specific concrete instance to be certified, the Scope sub-element that describes the 
generic cloud stack layer (i.e. SaaS, PaaS or IaaS), the TocDescription sub-element that contains 
a textual description about the TOC, the TocURI sub-element that contains a URI identifier (i.e. 
the reference to the services to be certificated) and the TocInterfaces sub-element that specify the 
operations whose execution and results are needed for the certification process. 
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Figure 6 - TOC element 
 
 
An example is given below: 
				<TOC	Id="ID001">	
								<ConcreteToc>server</ConcreteToc>			
	 <Scope>Saas</Scope>		
								<TocDescription>Application</TocDescription>				
								<TocURI>10.0.0.155</TocURI>		
								<TocInterfaces>	[.....]	</TocInterfaces>	
				</TOC>				
 
The TocInterfaces is an element of type targetOfCertificationType. This element includes an 
attribute, called “id”, which represents the unique identifier of the TOC, and is mandatory. Also, 
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the TocInterfaces includes a sequence of providesInterface and requiresInterface sub-elements. 
These elements specify sets of operations whose execution and results will need to be monitored 
or tested during the certification process. The providesInterface element specifies the interfaces 
that the target of certification offers itself. The requiresInterface element specifies the interfaces 
that the target of certification expects an external entity to have. 
	
The sub-elements of the TocInterfaces element specify how interfaces are described in the XML 
schema. This element is of TargetOfCertificationType and has an ID attribute specifying the 
unique identifier of the TocInterfaces element generated by the framework, and a sequence of 
providesInterface and requiresInterface elements, that are of InterfaceDeclType. 
• The providersInterface element as shown in Figure 7 is mandatory, includes a sequence 
of IDs, provider references (ProviderRef), zero or more Endpoints that indicate where the 
service will be invoked and Interfaces that define the interface that a TOC itself realises.  
 
	
Figure 7 - Provides Interface sub-element 
	
<TocInterfaces	id="id1">	
								<providesInterface>	
												[...]	
								</providesInterface>	
			<requiresInterface>	
												[…]	
								</requiresInterface>	
</TocInterfaces	>	
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• The requirersInterface element (Figure 8) is optional and includes a sequence of IDs, one 
or more provider references (ProviderRef) and zero or more Endpoints that indicate 
where the service will be invoked and Interfaces that the TOC requires from external 
entities.	
		
 
Figure 8 - Requires Interface sub-element 
 
Below is an example of the providesInterface and the requiresInterface elements in XML. In the 
following example, the security property that is certified is the data integrity-at-rest security 
property. According to that example, the interface that is provided by this entity is a set of 
operations for updating data by the service consumer to the TOC. The TOC requires one external 
interface from the certification authority concerning the authorisation of the service consumer 
who requested the update operation. 	
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<providesInterface>	
												<ID>interface::update::a::1/</ID>	
												<ProviderRef>Cumulus::provider::a::1</ProviderRef>	
												<Endpoint>	
																<ID>a111</ID>	
																<Location>http://www.cumulus-project.eu</Location>	
																<Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
												</Endpoint>	
												<Interface>	
																<InterfaceSpec>	
																				<Name>av::update::a::1</Name>	
																				<Operation>	
																								<InterfaceId>update::data::a::1</InterfaceId>	
																								<OperationId>update::operation::a::1</OperationId>	
																								<OperationName>update</OperationName	>	
																				</Operation>	
																</InterfaceSpec>	
												</Interface>	
								</providesInterface>	
								
							<requiresInterface>	
												<ID>interface::auth::ca::1</ID>	
												<ProviderRef></ProviderRef>	
												<Endpoint>	
																<ID>b111</ID>	
																<Location>http://www.cumulus-project.eu</Location>	
																<Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
												</Endpoint>	
												<Interface>	
																<InterfaceRef>	
																				<InterfaceLocation>	http://www.cumulus-project.eu	</InterfaceLocation>	
																</InterfaceRef>	
												</Interface>	
								</requiresInterface>	
 
3.5.4 Security property element 
For the hybrid certification model schema, I have used the SecurityProperty element from the 
Monitoring-based certification model schema, as it fits the hybrid purposes. A description of the 
Security Property element will be presented. 
The SecurityProperty element, as shown in Figure 9, defines the security property, which has to 
be certified by the Certification Model instance and is of securityPropertyType.	
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Figure 9 - Security Property element 
 
The SecurityProperty element includes a SecurityPropertyId, a SecurityPropertyDefinition, a 
Vocabulary and a ShortName attribute as defined in (CSA, D2.1 Development of security 
properties specification scheme and security dependency models, 2013). Additionally, it 
contains an Assertion element, which is of AssertionType.  
An example of the Security Property element in XML is given below: 
<SecurityProperty	SecurityPropertyId="	PercentageOfProcessedRequests">	
SecurityPropertyDefinition="percentage	of	successful	requests	processed	by	the	TOC	over	the	total	number	
of	submitted	requests"	Vocabulary="	BCR:availability:percentage-of-processed-requests"	ShortName="BCR01"	
<Assertion	ID="1100">	…	</Assertion>	
The Assertion sub-element, as shown in Figure 10, is used to provide the definition of the 
security property to be certified. Assertion is an element of complex type AssertionType. 
According to this type, an assertion consists of the interface declaration that specifies the 
interfaces that must be certified, the variable declaration that specify conditions within assertions 
that specify security properties and the guaranteed terms, which define the conditions that must 
be monitored and tested to guarantee that a security property is satisfied.  
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Figure 10 - Assertion sub-element 
 
The element InterfaceDeclr, as shown in Figure 11, defines the interface declarations and 
provides the means to represent the details of functional interface specifications. It includes the 
mandatory sub-element ID that identifies the interface declarations, the mandatory sub-element 
ProviderRef that identifies the party that is provides the interface, the optional Endpoint sub-
element that specifies the endpoints that implement the specific interface and where the interface 
operations can be invoked, and, finally, the mandatory sub-element Interface that defines the 
required interface.  
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Figure 11 - InterfaceDecl sub-element 
 
The element VariableDeclr, as shown in Figure 12, is of type variableType and is used to define 
variables to describe the conditions within assertions that specify formally security properties. 
This element has two attributes:  
i) persistent, that indicates whether the value of the variable is the same throughout all 
instances and  
ii) forMatching, that distinguishes between internal and external variables  
 
and consists of the following elements:  
• varName, that is of type String signifying the name of the variable;  
• either a varType of type String and value element of type String  or a value element of object 
type; OR  
• an array element of type arrayType with elements that describe the array structure 
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Figure 12 - VariableDeclr element 
	
The element Guaranteed, as shown in Figure 13, is of complex type AssertionFormulaType and 
represents a guarantee that a certain state of affairs will hold. The AssertionFormulaType has 
two attributes: 
i) the attribute ID that is the unique id of the formula, and 
ii) the attribute type that signifies if the guarantee is an assertion that needs to be 
checked against information that will arise after the events that will trigger the check 
of the assertion have occurred (i.e., a “future” assertion), or an assertion that should 
be checked against information that exists at the time point when the events that 
trigger the check of it have occurred (i.e., a “past” assertion) 
 
and contains the following sub-elements: 
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i) a list of quantification elements that define the quantifiers for the variables and time 
variables, used to specify conditions of the assertion  
ii) an optional precondition element that determines the conditions under which the 
assertion should be checked (i.e., the conditions which if become true should trigger 
the checking of the assertion) 
iii) a postcondition element that and determines the conditions that are guaranteed to 
hold (i.e. they become true if the preconditions are true). 
	
 
Figure 13 - Guaranteed sub-element 
 
An atomic condition can be of three different types:  
 
• an event condition (i.e., an element of eventConditionType) , 
• a state condition (i.e., an element of type stateConditionType) or 
• a relational condition (i.e., an element of type relationalConditionType). 
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Event conditions are conditions regarding the occurrence of events related to the TOC that the 
assertion refers to (e.g., the occurrence of an invocation (call) of an operation in one of the 
TOC’s interfaces or a response to such a call). A state condition is a condition about the state of 
the system that is being monitored at a given time point (e.g., a condition stating a certain user 
has already logged in to it). A relational condition is a condition about the value of a variable 
used in an assertion (e.g., a condition requiring a variable to have a certain value or a condition 
requiring two variables to have the same value). 
 
 
Figure 14 - Condition Types 
 
An event condition is a condition regarding the occurrence of a call of an operation (i.e., a call 
event), a response to a call of an operation (i.e., a reply event), or an execution of an operation 
that must be invoked (i.e., an execute event). An event condition includes by the following sub-
elements:  
 
(i) an eventID that identifies the event of the condition 
(ii) an optional correlatedEventID which refers to another event that may be related to 
this event. This is particularly important for my hybrid model as an event 
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representing the execution of a test can be correlated with an event representing the 
call 
(iii) a call, reply or execute element that specifies if the event of the condition is a call, 
reply or execute event.  
(iv) an element tVar that defines the timepoint at which the event is expected to occur. A 
tVar element can be defined as either timeVar element that is useful when an event is 
expected to occur at a specific time instance or a timePeriod element that defines the 
time period. A timeVar element consists of a varName element of type string for 
specifying the name of the variable, a varType element of type string, which has a 
fixed value, and, a value element of type string for specifying the time instance when 
the relevant event occurs. A time period element consists of a time period and a time 
period unit. The TimePeriod element is used when there is an event that is associated 
with is an execution event (i.e., operation call) that must be executed periodically. 
(v) a time range within which the event must occur and is defined by an upper and a 
lower time boundary. The lower boundary of the time range of an event is defined by 
the element fromTime. The upper boundary of the time range of an event is defined 
by the element toTime.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 - Event Condition Type 
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The call, reply and execute elements are of operationType, as shown in Figure 16, and consist of 
the following elements: 
 
• an interfaceId element that specifies the interface that the operation belongs to 
• an operationId element that specifies the unique id of the operation within the interface 
• an operationName element that specifies the name of the operation 
• zero or more inputVariable elements that specify the input variables of the operation. 
• zero or more outputVariable elements that specify the output variables of the operation. 
 
 
Figure 16 - Operation Type 
	
The second type of atomic conditions is the state conditions, as shown in Figure 17. State 
conditions refer to the state of the system. These relations can be set up at the beginning of 
the operation of a system or initiated by events that occur at specific time. These relations 
describe also the termination of events by other events. When a state condition is initiated by 
an event, it holds until the time it is terminated by another event. 
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A StateCondition element consists of the following elements: 
• an initiates element that expresses the initialisation of a state by an event at some time 
point  
• a terminates element that expresses the termination of a state by an event 
• a holdsAt element that represents a system state which it holds at specific time point 
• an initially element that represents a state value at the beginning of a monitored period of 
system operation. 
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Figure 17 - stateCondition sub-element 
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The third type of atomic conditions is the relational conditions that enable the specification 
conditions concerning the values of variables used in the assertions (e.g. a condition requiring 
that one of the input variables of an operation that has been invoked by a call event has a 
particular value at the time of the invocation), as shown in Figure 18. The relationalCondition 
element can be one of the following conditions: 
• equalto (operand1, operand2) 
• notEqualTo (operand1, operand2) 
• lessThan (operand1, operand2) 
• greaterThan (operand1, operand2) 
• lessThanEqualTo (operand1, operand2) 
• greaterThanEqualTo (operand1, operand2) 
Finally, a relational condition element has also a timeVar element that expresses the time point at 
which the relational condition should hold.  
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Figure 18 - relationalCondition sub-element 
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The operands are of OperandType and can be variables, operation calls, expressions, event series 
expressions or constants, as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19 - operandType 
An operationCall element is of type functionType, as shown in Figure 20, and includes the 
following elements: 
• a name element that specifies the name of the function; 
• a partner element that signifies the service providing the function and 
• zero or more argument elements which may be of one of  the following types: an 
eventSeriesVariable, a variable element, a constant element or a function element of 
functionType. An operation call element defines a function that needs to be executed. 
When a function operand is encountered during the evaluation of a relational condition, 
the values of its arguments are established first and then the function is executed. 
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Figure 20 - operationCall sub-element 
 
The eventSeriesExpression, as shown in Figure 21, specifies the computation over a series of 
values of some arguments. This element consists of the following elements: (a) an 
eventSeriesCondition element that signifies the conditions that produces the series values and (b) 
a computation element which signifies the computation that should be performed over the series 
values. The computation element contains either an execute element or a function element. The 
eventSeriesExpression element supports the cases where the execution of tests is required. 
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Figure 21 - eventSeriesExpression sub-element 
 
An example of the Guaranteed sub-element is given below expressed in XML. I am providing a 
rule for the data integrity-at-rest security property where requests for updates of _TOC data are 
monitored, and, for every such request that is granted by the TOC (there is a verification code 
with the value “granted”) within a specific time frame of 100 msec, the rule requests the 
execution of a test to check if the entity that requested the update had indeed the authorisation to 
update data. 
 
<Assertion	ID="AS001">	
			<InterfaceDeclr>	
	 <ID>0001</ID>	
	 <ProviderRef>proRef1</ProviderRef>	
	 <Endpoint>	
	 	 <ID>eop1</ID>	
	 	 <Location>http://</Location>	
	 	 <Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
	 </Endpoint>	
	 <Interface>	
	 	 <InterfaceSpec>	
	 	 			 	 <Name>update</Name>	
	 	 	 	 <Operation>	
	 	 	 	 <interfaceId>updateData</interfaceId>	
	 	 	 	 <OperationId>id0001</OperationId>	
	 	 	 	 <operationName>updateOp</operationName>	
	 	 	 	 <inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>cred</varName>	
	 	 	 			 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </inputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
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	 	 	 	 	 <varName>data</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </inputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>auth</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>cred</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>data</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </outputVariable>	
																																<outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>vCode</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 </Operation>	
	 	 </InterfaceSpec>	
	 </Interface>	
					</InterfaceDeclr>	
					<InterfaceDeclr>	
	 <ID>002</ID>	
	 <ProviderRef>proRef2</ProviderRef>	
	 <Endpoint>	
	 	 <ID>eop2</ID>	
	 	 <Location>http://</Location>	
	 	 <Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
	 </Endpoint>	
	 <Interface>	
	 	 <InterfaceSpec>	
	 	 	 	 <Name>authorise</Name>	
	 	 	 	 <Operation>	
	 	 	 	 <interfaceId>authoriseagent</interfaceId>	
	 	 	 	 <OperationId>id0002</OperationId>	
	 	 	 	 <operationName>authop</operationName>	
	 	 	 	 <inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>cred</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </inputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>data</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </inputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 <outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>auth</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 </outputVariable>	
 68 
 
	 	 	 	 </Operation>	
	 	 </InterfaceSpec>	
	 </Interface>	
</InterfaceDeclr>	
<Guaranteed	ID="av1"	type="Future_Formula">	
	 					<quantification>	
	 	 <quantifier>forall</quantifier>	
	 	 						<timeVariable>	
	 	 							 <varName>t1</varName>	
	 	 							 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 						</timeVariable>	
	 	 </quantification>	
	 	 <quantification>	
	 	 						<quantifier>existential</quantifier>	
	 	 												<timeVariable>	
	 	 	 <varName>t2</varName>	
	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 												</timeVariable>	
	 	 							</quantification>	
	 	 <precondition>	
	 	 						<atomicCondition	conditionID="ac0">	
	 	 											<eventCondition	unconstrained="true">	
	 	 	 <event>	
	 	 	 					<eventID	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 											<varName>VID0</varName>	
	 	 	 					</eventID>	
	 	 	 					<call>	
	 	 	 									<interfaceId>	interface::update::a::1/</interfaceId>	
	 	 	 										<OperationId>1</OperationId>	
	 	 	 										<operationName>upload</operationName>	
	 	 	 											<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>status1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 					<varType>OpStatus</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					<value>REQ-B</value>	
	 	 	 											</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 											<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>sender</varName>	
	 	 	 	 					<varType>Entity</varType>	
																																						<value></value>	
	 	 	 										</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 										<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>receiver</varName>	
	 	 	 	 					<varType>Entity</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					<value></value>	
	 	 	 										</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 										<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>source1</varName>	
	 	 	 						 					<varType>Entity</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					<value></value>	
	 	 	 										</inputVariable>	
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																																		<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>serviceId</varName>	
	 	 	 	 					<varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					<value></value>	
	 	 	 											</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 										<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 					<varName>cred</varName>	
	 	 	 	 					<varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 											</inputVariable>	
																																				<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>data</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 		</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 		<inputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>auth</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 		</inputVariable>	
	 	 	 		</call>	
	 	 	 					<tVar>	
	 	 	 								<timeVar>	
	 	 	 	 <varName>t1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 								</timeVar>	
	 	 	 					</tVar>	
	 	 	 					<fromTime>	
	 	 	 											<time>	
	 	 	 	 <varName>t1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 											</time>	
	 	 	 						</fromTime>	
	 	 	 						<toTime>	
	 	 	 												<time>	
	 	 	 	 <varName>t1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 													</time>	
	 	 	 						</toTime>	
	 	 	 </event>	
	 	 												</eventCondition>	
	 	 						</atomicCondition>	
																						<WrappedCondition>	
	 	 	 <operator>and</operator>	
	 	 	 								<assertionCondition>	
	 	 	 	 <atomicCondition>	
	 	 	 	 						<relationalCondition>	
	 	 	 	 	 <equal>	
	 	 	 	 	 					<operand1>	
	 	 	 	 	 													<variable>	
	 	 	 	 	 							 						<varName>vCode</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 	 						<varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 	 													</variable>	
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	 	 	 	 																							</operand1>	
	 	 	 	 	 					<operand2>	
	 	 	 	 	 														<constant>	
	 	 	 	 	 														<name>vcode</name>	
	 	 	 	 	 																<value>granted</value>	
	 	 	 	 	 													</constant>	
	 	 	 	 													</operand2>	
	 	 	 	 	 </equal>	
	 	 	 	 	 <timeVar>	
	 	 	 	 	 				<varName>t2</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 				<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 	 	 </timeVar>	
	 	 	 	 			</relationalCondition>	
	 	 	 	 </atomicCondition>	
																													</assertionCondition>	
	 	 												</WrappedCondition>	
	 	 </precondition>	
	 	 <postcondition>	
	 	 						<atomicCondition	conditionID="ac1">	
	 	 	 <eventCondition	unconstrained="true">	
	 	 	 						<event>	
	 	 	 										<eventID	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 <varName>VID1</varName>	
	 	 	 										</eventID>	
	 	 	 	 <execute>	
	 	 	 	 						<interfaceId>	interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
	 	 	 	 						<OperationId>2</OperationId>	
	 	 	 	 						<operationName>authorise</operationName>	
	 	 	 	 						<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>status2</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>OpStatus</varType>	
	 	 	 	 	 <value>RES-B</value>	
	 	 	 	 					</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 					<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>receiver1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>Entity</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 					<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>sender1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>Entity</varType>	
	 	 	 	 						</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 							<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>source1</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>Entity</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 					<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>serviceId</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 					<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
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	 	 	 	 	 <varName>cred</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					</outputVariable>	
																																						<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>auth</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 						</outputVariable>	
																																							<outputVariable	forMatching="true"	persistent="false">	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>vCode2</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>string</varType>	
	 	 	 	 						</outputVariable>	
	 	 	 	 </execute>	
	 	 	 	 <tVar>	
	 	 	 	 					<timeVar>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varName>t3</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 	 						</timeVar>	
	 	 	 	 </tVar>	
	 	 	 	 <fromTime>	
	 	 	 	 					<time>	
	 	 	 	 								<varName>t2</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 	 						</time>	
	 	 	 	 </fromTime>	
																																	<toTime>	
	 	 	 	 					<time>	
	 	 	 	 								<varName>t3</varName>	
	 	 	 	 	 <varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
	 	 	 	 					</time>	
	 	 	 	 					<Expression>	
	 	 	 	 							<plus>100</plus>	
	 	 	 							 					</Expression>	
	 	 	 	 </toTime>	
	 	 	 			</event>	
	 	 	 </eventCondition>	
	 	 </atomicCondition>	
									</postcondition>	
</Guaranteed>	
 
3.5.5 Collector Evidence Aggregation element 
The Collector Evidence Aggregation element, as shown in Figure 22, defines how evidence will 
be collected and aggregated. This element contains the TestingCollector element that describes 
the type of testing that needs to be performed along with the frequency of periodic testing, the 
MonitoringConfigurations element that specifies the list of the monitoring configurations that 
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have been used to collect the evidence for generating certificates, the 
MonitoringAggregatedResultsInfo element that defines how often the monitoring evidence will 
be checked to create a new certificate, the EventSummary elemene that contains information 
about the number of violations detected in monitoring and testing, the FunctionalAggregatorId 
that defines what type of aggregation should be done in the events (e.g. min value, max value, 
standard deviation, average value), and, the IntermediateResults element which specifies if there 
is a need to aggregate evidence between two predefined aggregation periods, to check the 
validity of the certificate. This element contains elements from the Test-based certification 
model schema and the Monitoring-based certification model schema, but has been refined to fit 
the hybrid purposes. 
 
Figure 22 - CollectorsEvidenceAggregation element 
The TestingCollector, as shown in Figure 23, has a unique identifier attribute of the collector 
element and an attribute that defines if the testing required will be static or dynamic, and consists 
of the following elements: 
• a TestCategory element, that defines if the type of testing required 
• a TestDescription element that specifies the testing mechanism, describing what needs to 
be tested 
• a TestFrequencyUnit element that defines the unit concerning the frequency of testing that 
is required 
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• a TestFrequencyValue that defines the value of the frequency of testing that is required 
 
 
Figure 23 - TestingCollector sub-element 
	
An example of the TestingCollector element for the certification of the data integrity-at-rest 
security property is shown below. According to this example, in order to issue a certificate we 
need to perform periodic online integration testing and to send authcodes to perform the 
authorisation operation. 
	
<TestingCollector	Id="Id0"	isStatic="false">	
												<TestCategory>integration</TestCategory>	
												<TestDescription>	Send	authcodes	(with	malformed	pass)	to	perform	authorisation			
																	operation</TestDescription>	
												<TestFrequencyUnit>sec</TestFrequencyUnit>	
												<TestFrequencyValue>3</TestFrequencyValue>	
</TestingCollector>	
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The MonitoringConfigurations element, as shown in Figure 24, specifies the list of the 
monitoring configurations that have been used to collect the evidence for generating certificates 
and includes a unique Id, a list of components of the monitoring environment that can be 
sensors, which are components capable of capturing and transmitting primitive monitoring 
events or reasoners, which are the monitors that are capable of analysing events and checking 
whether monitoring conditions are satisfied. 
 
 
Figure 24 - MonitoringConfigurations sub-element 
 
In the following example, the framework is configured with a reasoner component, whose 
endpoint is: https://192.168.43.23:8888/CumulusService.wsdl. 
<MonitoringConfigurations>	
												<MonitoringConfiguration>	
																<Component>	
																				<Reasoner>	
																								<EndPoint>https://192.168.43.23:8888/CumulusService.wsdl</EndPoint>	
																								<AssertionId>av::1</AssertionId>	
																				</Reasoner>	
																</Component>	
</MonitoringConfiguration>	
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The MonitoringAggregatorResultsInfo element, as shown in Figure 25, defines how often the 
monitoring evidence will be checked to create a new certificate, with new aggregated evidence. 
This element includes the following attributes: 
• the StartDate of the first aggregation 
• the Timestamp of the monitoring event 
• the NumberOfMonitoringEvents, which is the number of the primitive monitoring events being 
aggregated 
• the intervalsTime, which specifies how often should the evidence being aggregated 
• the intervalUnit, which declares the unit used to specify the intervals. 
 
 
Figure 25 - MonitoringAggregatedResultsInfo sub-element 
 
The EventSummary element, as shown in Figure 26, defines the minimum number of satisfactions 
and the number of violations required for issuing a certificate. The evidence used to detect the 
violations and the satisfactions come from monitoring and testing evidence. This sub-element 
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includes the maxNumberOfMonitoringTestingEvidenceViolations and the 
minNumberOfMonitoringTestingEvidenceSatisfactions attributes, and describes the maximum 
acceptable number of violations and the minimum acceptable number of satisfactions, for a 
certificate to be issued.  
 
 
Figure 26 - EventSummary sub-element 
 
The FunctionalAggregatorId, as shown in Figure 27, is an optional element and defines what 
type of aggregation should be done in the events (e.g. min value, max value, standard 
deviation, average value). 
 
Figure 27 - FunctionalAggregationId sub-element 
 
Finally, the IntermediateResults, as shown in Figure 28, is an optional element and specifies if 
there is a need to aggregate evidence between two predefined aggregation periods, to check the 
validity of the certificate.  
 
Figure 28 - IntermediateResults sub-element 
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A full example of the CollectorEvidenceAggregation element in XML is given below. In this 
example, I examine the data integrity-at-rest security property. With periodic online testing 
authcodes are sent to perform the authorisation operation. The framework is configured with 
a reasoner component with a predefined endpoint. The monitoring aggregation will start on 
date “2015-01-01” and the aggregation of detailed evidence should be carried out at intervals 
of 840 hours. The number of monitoring events than need to be collected is 520. The 
maximum number of violations between testing and monitoring evidence is 100. The average 
value that will be applied for the property will be a Boolean. 
 
<CollectorEvidenceAggregation>	
<TestingCollector	Id="Id0"	isStatic="false">	
												<TestCategory>integration</TestCategory>	
												<TestDescription>	Send	authcodes	(with	malformed	pass)	to	perform	authorisation			
																	operation</TestDescription>	
												<TestFrequencyUnit>sec</TestFrequencyUnit>	
												<TestFrequencyValue>3</TestFrequencyValue>	
		 </TestingCollector>	
<MonitoringConfigurations>	
												<MonitoringConfiguration>	
																<Component>	
																				<Reasoner>	
																								<EndPoint>https://192.168.43.23:8888/CumulusService.wsdl</EndPoint>	
																								<AssertionId>av::1</AssertionId>	
																				</Reasoner>	
																</Component>	
								</MonitoringConfiguration>	
<MonitoringAggregatedResultsInfo	StartDate="2014-01-01"	Timestamp"2014-01-01"		
		 	NumberOfMonitoringEvents="520"	IntervalsTime="840"	IntervalUnit="hours"	/>	
<EventSummary	minNumberOfMonitoringTestingEvidenceViolations="100">	
<FunctionalAggregatorId>Average</FunctionalAggregatorId>	
<IntermediateResults>False</IntermediateResults>	
</CollectorEvidenceAggregation>	
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3.5.6 Lifecycle element 
The LifecycleModel element, as shown in Figure 29, defines the basic stages in the generation 
and management of the certificates. The LifecycleModel element from the Monitoring-based 
certification model schema has been used, but has been refined to fit the hybrid purposes. This 
element consists of an optional InitialState, an optional FinalState, a sequence of atomic states, a 
transitions element that describes the transition between the different states, zero or more 
provided interfaces and zero or more required interfaces.  
 
 
 
Figure 29 - LifeCycleModel element 
 
The InitialState element has a stateId attribute that identifies the initial state uniquely in the state 
transitional model and a name attribute, as shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30 - InitialState sub-element 
	
An example of the InitialState sub-element is given below in XML: 
<InitialState	stateId="stateId0"	name="Activated"/>	
 
The states element is of type StatesType, which is defined as a sequence of state elements of 
type StateType as shown in Figure 31. The possible atomic states of a certificate are “Activated” 
(Initial State), “Issued”, “Expired”, “SuspendCertificate”, “Revoke”, “Ended”, “Continuous 
MonitoringandTestExecution” and “Issuing”. A state element consists of a sequence of one or 
more atomic states that are of AtomicStateType. The definition is given below: 
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Figure 31 - StateType sub-element 
 
An atomic state element is described by the attributes includes a stateId attribute which uniquely 
identifies the state within a state transition model, a name attribute which provides the name of 
the state, a description attribute which can be used to provide a description about this state and a 
sequence of actions that must be executed, such as the execution of tests, the updating of internal 
variables, the invocation of operations or the assignment of variables. An action has an 
executionPoint attribute that defines whether the action is executed when the entity enters or 
exits the state and contains a sequence of actions, as shown in Figure 32.  
	
	
Figure 32 - action sub-element 
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An example of the states element is given below. This example refers to the data integrity-at-
rest security property that has been introduced earlier. According to this example, the 
“ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution” state requires the execution of a test to check if the 
agent who requested the update of data is authorised. 
<states>	
				<state>	
							<atomicState	stateId="stateId1"	name="ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution"	description="collection	
of	monitoring	and	testing	evidence">	
													<action	executionPoint="authorisation	interface">	
																			<action>	
																							<operationInvocation	interfaceId="interface::auth::ca::1">	
																														<invocation>	
																																			<execute>	
																																								<interfaceId>interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																																								<OperationId>id0002</OperationId>	
																																								<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																																			</execute>	
																														</invocation>	
																							</operationInvocation>	
																			</action>	
													</action>	
								</atomicState>	
					</state>	
</states>		
	
 
The transitions in a LifeCycle Model are described by a Transitions element, which is of type 
TransitionsType and is shown in Figure 33. This element has one or more sub-elements, which 
are of type IndividualTransitionType. 
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Figure 33 - transition sub-element 
 
Each IndividualTransitionType element includes: 
• an Id attribute of type string, which refers to the identifier of the transition 
• a From attribute of type string, which refers to the identifier of the state that the transition 
starts from 
• a To attribute of type string, which refers to the identifier of the state that the transition 
ends up 
Transitions can be triggered by the following types of events: 
• a system condition whose value is changed (such conditions are described by the sub-
element WhenCondition), or 
• a call event sent to the entity  
• a reply event sent to the entity 
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• an optional GuardCondition element expressing a condition which must be true when an 
event that can trigger the transition occurs for the transition to be taken. 
 
 
Figure 34 - Guard Conditions 
	
• Action elements defining the actions that must be executed and completed before the 
transition takes place and the before the entity the destination state of the transition. The 
tests that need to be executed in order to collect evidence are part of the assertion 
language. Therefore, when additional tests are required, they are defined through the 
Action element.  
 
An example is given below. In this example, I describe the transition from “Activated” state to 
the “ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution” state. This transition is activated when a reply of 
an update operation in a TOC is detected at some time point t1. The GuardCondition element 
describes the authorisation condition that must be true for the transition to take place. According 
to this condition the vCode needs to have a value “granted”. The action element defines the 
execution of tests that need to take place in order to collect the testing evidence required. 
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<transitions>	
							<transition	Id="1011"	From="ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution"	To="Issued">	
																<ReplyEvent	interfaceId="interfaceId4">	
																				<invocation>	
																								<execute>	
																												<interfaceId>interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																												<OperationId>id0002</OperationId>	
																												<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																								</execute>	
																				</invocation>	
																</ReplyEvent>	
																<GuardCondition	negated="false">	
																				<Condition	negated="false"	relation="EQUAL-TO">	
																								<Operand1>	
																												<ArithmeticExpression>	
																																<ArithmeticOperand>	
																																				<evidenceRefOperand	referencePath==	"//VariableDeclr/Var/[text()=				
																																				'vCode']"/>			
																																</ArithmeticOperand>	
																												</ArithmeticExpression>	
																								</Operand1>	
																								<Operand2>	
																												<ArithmeticExpression>	
																																<ArithmeticOperand>	
																																				<Constant	type="granted">Constant0</Constant>	
																																</ArithmeticOperand>	
																												</ArithmeticExpression>	
																								</Operand2>	
																				</Condition>	
																</GuardCondition>	
																<action>	
																				<operationInvocation	interfaceId="interfaceId6">	
																								<invocation>	
																												<execute>	
																																<interfaceId> interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																																<OperationId>id002</OperationId>	
																																<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																												</execute>	
																								</invocation>	
																				</operationInvocation>	
															</action>		
							</transition>	
</transitions>	
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The FinalState element has a stateId attribute that identifies the final state uniquely in the state 
transitional model and a name attribute, as shown in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35 - Final State 
	
An example of the FinalState sub-element is given below in XML: 
<FinalState	stateId="stateId5"	name="Ended"/>	
  
The providesInterfaces element includes a set of interfaces, which are realised by the entity 
whose behaviour is described by the model, while the requiredInterfaces element includes a set 
of operations which the entity whose behaviour is described by the model expects other external 
interacting entities to have. Both these elements are of InterfaceDeclrType (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36 - InterfaceDeclrType 
 
An example of a hybrid Lifecycle for a certificate is presented below. Initially, after the 
activation, the certificate enters the “ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution” state and 
evidence is gathered through monitoring and testing. When enough evidence is collected, 
according to the Sufficiency Conditions, then the certificate status is updated to “Issued”. Then, 
if the expiration conditions are reached, the status of the certificate is updated to “Expired”, 
otherwise evidence collected from monitoring and testing are cross-checked. If the evidence is 
contradictory then the status of the certificate is updated to “Suspend Certificate”, otherwise the 
certificate will enter the “Issuing” state. In this case, if violations are not resolved the status will 
be updated to “Revoke”, otherwise the certificate will enter the “Issuing” state.  
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Figure 37 - LifeCycle Model 
 
An XML example of the lifecycle model describing the transition from the 
“ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution” to the “Issued” state is given below.  
<LifeCycleModel>	
			<InitialState	stateId="stateId0"	name="Activated"/>	
							<states>	
									<state>	
											<atomicState	stateId="stateId1"	name="ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution"			
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													description="collection	of	monitoring	and	testing	evidence">	
																<action	executionPoint="authorisation	interface">	
																			<action>	
																							<operationInvocation	interfaceId="interface::auth::ca::1">	
																														<invocation>	
																																			<execute>	
																																								<interfaceId>interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																																								<OperationId>id0002</OperationId>	
																																								<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																																			</execute>	
																														</invocation>	
																							</operationInvocation>	
																				</action>	
																</action>	
												</atomicState>	
										</state>	
								</states>		
								<transitions>	
												<transition	Id="1011"	From="ContinuousMonitoringAndTestExecution"	To="Issued">	
																<ReplyEvent	interfaceId="interfaceId4">	
																				<invocation>	
																								<execute>	
																												<interfaceId>interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																												<OperationId>id0002</OperationId>	
																												<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																								</execute>	
																				</invocation>	
																</ReplyEvent>	
																<GuardCondition	negated="false">	
																				<Condition	negated="false"	relation="EQUAL-TO">	
																								<Operand1>	
																												<ArithmeticExpression>	
																																<ArithmeticOperand>	
																																				<evidenceRefOperand	referencePath==	"//VariableDeclr/Var/[text()=				
																																				'vCode']"/>			
																																</ArithmeticOperand>	
																												</ArithmeticExpression>	
																								</Operand1>	
																								<Operand2>	
																												<ArithmeticExpression>	
																																<ArithmeticOperand>	
																																				<Constant	type="granted">Constant0</Constant>	
																																</ArithmeticOperand>	
																												</ArithmeticExpression>	
																								</Operand2>	
																				</Condition>	
																</GuardCondition>	
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																<action>	
																				<operationInvocation	interfaceId="interfaceId6">	
																								<invocation>	
																												<execute>	
																																<interfaceId> interface::auth::ca::1</interfaceId>	
																																<OperationId>id002</OperationId>	
																																<operationName>authop</operationName>	
																												</execute>	
																								</invocation>	
																				</operationInvocation>	
															</action>		
										</transition>	
						</transitions>	
						<FinalState	stateId="stateId2"	name="Issued"/>	
						<providesInterface>	
												<ID>interface::update::a::1/</ID>	
												<ProviderRef>Cumulus::provider::a::1</ProviderRef>	
												<Endpoint>	
																<ID>a111</ID>	
																<Location>http://www.cumulus-project.eu</Location>	
																<Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
												</Endpoint>	
												<Interface>	
																<InterfaceSpec>	
																				<Name>av::update::a::1</Name>	
																				<Operation>	
																								<InterfaceId>update::data::a::1</InterfaceId>	
																								<OperationId>update::operation::a::1</OperationId>	
																								<OperationName>update</OperationName	>	
																				</Operation>	
																</InterfaceSpec>	
												</Interface>	
								</providesInterface>	
								<requiresInterface>	
												<ID>interface::auth::ca::1</ID>	
												<ProviderRef></ProviderRef>	
												<Endpoint>	
																<ID>b111</ID>	
																<Location>http://www.cumulus-project.eu</Location>	
																<Protocol>SOAP</Protocol>	
												</Endpoint>	
												<Interface>	
																<InterfaceRef>	
																				<InterfaceLocation>	http://www.cumulus-project.eu	</InterfaceLocation>	
																</InterfaceRef>	
												</Interface>	
								</requiresInterface>	
</LifeCycle	Model>	
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3.5.7 AssessmentScheme element 
The AssessmentScheme, as shown in Figure 38, element specifies how the evidence collected 
from testing and monitoring will be assessed in order to check if a security property is satisfied. 
This element will check if the evidence sufficiency and expiration conditions are satisfied. 
Additionally, it includes the extra conditions that will define if there are events whose execution 
is forced as part of the assertion conditions (hybrid dependent-mode certification where 
monitoring triggers testing and vice-versa), otherwise the hybrid certification will be of 
independent mode. The EvidenceSufficiencyConditions and ExpirationConditions elements of 
the Monitoring-based certification model schema have been refined and amended for my hybrid 
approach. 
 
 
Figure 38 - Assessment Scheme element 
The TriggerDecisionCondition element, as shown in Figure 39, is an optional element of 
TriggerDecisionConditionType and defines the type of hybrid dependent-mode certification, 
describing the conditions that trigger the collection of additional events when there are events 
whose execution are forced as part of the assertion conditions. This element includes a choice 
between the MonitoringTriggeredConditions sub-element that defines the triggering conditions 
when Monitoring is triggered by Testing and the TestingTriggeredConditions sub-element that 
defines the triggering conditions when Testing is triggered by Monitoring.  
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Figure 39 - TriggerDecisionCondition sub-element 
 
The MonitoringTriggeredConditions element, as shown in Figure 40, includes a sequence of the 
following sub-elements: 
o an EventId sub-element, which is of type string and specifies the Id of the testing event 
which will trigger monitoring 
o a ConditionsDescription sub-element of string type, which describes why monitoring is 
triggered by the execution of test cases  
o a TimestampOfEventFromTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and specifies 
when the testing event could have started 
o a TimestampOfEventToTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and specifies 
when the testing event could have terminated 
o a TimestampOfTriggeredEventFromTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and 
specifies when the monitoring event could have started 
o a TimestampOfTriggeredEventToTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and 
specifies when the monitoring event could have terminated 
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Figure 40 - MonitoringTriggeredConditionsType 
 
An example of the MonitoringTriggeredConditions sub-element is following. In this example, I 
want to certify the data integrity-at-rest security property, which expresses the ability to detect 
and report any alteration of stored data in a target of certification (TOC). I will use a hybrid 
model based on periodic testing that will detect if stored data have been modified and will 
monitor the periods between the tests that revealed data modifications to check if appropriate 
notifications have also been sent. Data modifications could be detected by obtaining the hash 
value of the relevant data file in the TOC periodically. Then, if across the execution of two 
consecutive tests, the last retrieved hash value of the file is different from the previous hash 
value, a data modification action can be deduced. In parallel with the execution of this periodic 
test, the hybrid model will also monitor the execution of notification operations. Hence, when a 
data modification action is detected by two consecutive tests, the hybrid model could also check 
whether a correlated notification operation has been executed within the period between the 
tests.  This example in XML is given below: 
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<TriggerDecisionCondition>	
								<MonitoringTriggeredConditions>	
												<EventId>Id1010</EventId>	
												<ConditionDescription>monitor	period	between	tests</ConditionDescription>	
												<TimestampOfEventfromTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
												</TimestampOfEventfromTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventtoTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>2</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventtoTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventTriggeredfromTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>2</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventTriggeredfromTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventTriggeredtoTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>6</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventTriggeredtoTime>		
									</MonitoringTriggeredConditions>	
</TriggerDecisionCondition>	
 
The TestingTriggeredConditions element as shown in Figure 41 includes a sequence of the 
following elements: 
o an EventId sub-element, which is of type string and specifies the Id of the monitoring 
event which triggers testing 
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o a ConditionsDescription sub-element, which describes why testing is triggered by 
monitoring 
o a TimestampOfEventFromTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and specifies 
when the monitoring event could have started 
o a TimestampOfEventToTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and specifies 
when the monitoring event could have terminated 
o a TimestampOfTriggeredEventFromTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and 
specifies when the testing event could have started 
o a TimestampOfTriggeredEventToTime sub-element, which is of timeVariabletype and 
specifies when the testing event could have terminated 
o an AdditionalCoverageRequired sub-element which is of type string and describes why 
monitoring triggers testing. 
o a Periodicity sub-element, which specifies the periodicity of online testing. 
 
 
Figure 41 - TestingTriggeredConditionsType 
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An example of the TestingTriggeredConditions sub-element is following. This time, I will use 
another hybrid model to certify the same security property, that will rely on testing to ensure that 
every time that an agent that requests a data alteration, it has the authorisation right to do the 
requested alteration. I will monitor requests for updates of the TOC data through the normal 
updating interface. However, for every such request that is granted by the TOC, the model will 
request the execution of a test to check if the entity that requested the update had indeed the 
authorisation to update data. This example in XML is given below: 
<TriggerDecisionCondition>	
								<TestingTriggeredConditions>	
												<EventId>Id1011</EventId>	
												<ConditionDescription>compare	hash	values	to	check	authorisation	rights</ConditionDescription>	
												<TimestampOfEventfromTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
												</TimestampOfEventfromTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventtoTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>2</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventtoTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventTriggeredfromTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>2</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventTriggeredfromTime>	
												<TimestampOfEventTriggeredtoTime>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																				</time>	
																				<Expression>	
																								<plus>6</plus>	
																				</Expression>	
												</TimestampOfEventTriggeredtoTime>		
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												<Periodicity>	
																				<time>	
																								<varName>seconds</varName>	
																								<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																								<value>1<value/>	
																				</time>	
												<Periodicity>	
							</TestingTriggeredConditions>	
</TriggerDecisionCondition>	
 
The evidence sufficiency conditions are conditions regarding the minimum extent and the profile 
of the monitoring and testing events. The EvidenceSufficiencyCondition element, as shown in 
Figure 42, has a unique identifier (Id) and defines the conditions of the sufficiency conditions that 
must apply to monitoring and testing evidence in order to issue a certificate.  
 
Figure 42 - Evidence Sufficiency Conditions sub-element 
 
The sub-elements are presented below: 
o ExpectedSystemOperationModelCondition (Figure 43): A condition of this type is used 
to define an expected operation model of TOC. When the StateTransitionModel is 
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defined, then the gathered evidence will be deemed sufficient for issuing a certificate 
only if the actual operation of TOC does not deviate from this model.  
 
Figure 43 - ExpectedSystemOperationModel sub-element 
 
o MonitoringPeriodCondition (Figure 44): A condition of this type can be used to define for 
how long the TOC should be monitored before the evidence is considered sufficient and a 
certificate can be issued. 
 
Figure 44 - MonitoringPeiodCondition sub-element 
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o MonitoringEventsCondition (Figure 45): A condition of this type can be used to define the 
minimum number of monitoring events that should be gathered before a certificate can be 
issued.  
 
Figure 45 - MonitoringEventsCondition sub-element 
 
o TestingPeriodCondition (Figure 46): A condition of this type can be used to define the 
minimum testing period required for a certificate to be issued.  
 
Figure 46 - TestingPeriodCondition sub-element 
 
o TestingEventsCondition (Figure 47): A condition of this type can be used to define the 
minimum number of test events that should be gathered before a certificate can be issued. 
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Figure 47 - TestingEventsCondition sub-element 
 
Several examples of that cover all the cases of the EvidenceSufficiencyCondition elements are 
given below. The first example refers to an expected operation model of the TOC and describes 
the expected states and transitions. 
<EvidenceSufficiencyCondition	Id="1011">	
				<ExpectedSystemOperationModel>	
							<InitialState	stateId="state1"	name="Activated"/>	
							<states>	
												<state>											 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 <atomicState	stateId="state2"	name="Issued"/>	
												</state>	
												<state>		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 <atomicState	stateId="state3"	name="Expired"/>	
												</state>	
	 				<state>		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 <atomicState	stateId="state4"	name="Suspend	Certificate"/>	
												</state>	
	 				<state>		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 <atomicState	stateId="state5"	name="Revoke"/>	
												</state>	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 				<state>		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 <atomicState	stateId="state6"	name="End"/>	
												</state>	
								</states>	
								<transitions>	
													<transition	Id="1011"	From="state1"	To="state2">	
																<WhenCondition>	
																		<event	sufficiencyConditionSatisfied	/>	
																	</WhenCondition>	
													</transition>	
													<transition	Id="1100"	From="state2"	To="state3">	
																	<WhenCondition	ExpirationReached>	
																			<event	expirationReached/>	
																	</WhenCondition>	
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													</transition>	
													<transition	Id="1001"	From="state2"	To="state4">	
																	<WhenCondition>	
																			<event	violationDetected/>	
																	</WhenCondition>	
													</transition>	
													<transition	Id="1010"	From="state4"	To="state5">	
																<GuardCondition>	
																				<Condition	negated="True"	relation="NOT-EQUAL-TO">	
																						<Operand1><Operand1/>	
																						<Operand2><Operand2/>	
																</GuardCondition>	
													</transition>	
													<transition	Id="1000"	From="state4"	To="state6">	
																	<WhenCondition>	
																		<Condition>	
																			<event	violationResolved/>	
																	</Condition>	
																	</WhenCondition>	
													</transition>	
												</transitions>	
</EvidenceSufficiencyCondition>	
 
The second example refers to a monitoring period condition and states that the cloud service 
needs to be monitored for a minimum of 500 hours. 
<EvidenceSufficiencyCondition	Id="1011">	
												<MonitoringPeriodCondition	id="1011"	minMonitoredPeriod="500"	periodUnit="hours"/>	
</EvidenceSufficiencyCondition>	
 
The third example refers to a monitoring events condition and states that  a minimum of 1000 
events need to be monitored before issuing a certificate. 
<EvidenceSufficiencyCondition	Id="1001">	
												<MonitoringPeriodCondition	eventsNo="1000"/>	
</EvidenceSufficiencyCondition>	
 
The fourth example refers to a testing period condition and states that the cloud service needs to 
be tested for a minimum of 100 hours. 
<EvidenceSufficiencyCondition	Id="1011">	
												<TestingPeriodCondition	id="1010"	minTestPeriod="100"	periodUnit="hours"/>	
</EvidenceSufficiencyCondition>	
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The fifth example refers to a testing events condition and states that a minimum of 500 events 
need to be tested before issuing a certificate. 
<EvidenceSufficiencyCondition	Id="1001">	
												<TestingEventsCondition	eventsNo="500"/>	
</EvidenceSufficiencyCondition>	
 
The ExpirationConditions element as shown in Figure 48 defines when an issued certificate, 
which has been generated according to the given certification model, should expire and a new 
one could be issued by considering further evidence. 
	
 
Figure 48 - Expiration Conditions sub-element 
 
An expiration condition has a unique identifier (Id) and a choice of two different ways to define 
the expiration date: 
• The first way is by an absoluteDate, which is an element of type date, or 
• The second way is by an elapsedPeriod, which is an element of type ElapsedPeriodType. 
An ElapsedPeriod element can be used when a certificate needs to expire at the end of a 
specific period of time from the date that it was issued. An ElapsedPeriod element 
expresses this by defining a period of time, as the number of time units that should elapse 
following the creation of the certificate. 
 
An example of an expiration condition is given below. According to this example, the certificate 
will expire 5 months after the issuing date. 
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<ExpirationCondition	Id="486">	
							<elapsedPeriod	period="5"	periodUnit="months"/>	
</ExpirationCondition>	
	
3.5.8 CrosscheckScheme element 
This element defines the conditions for cross-checking evidence collected from testing and 
monitoring. This element also contains further exploration conditions. In case there are 
discrepancies between the evidence gathered from testing and monitoring, certain data 
exploration techniques will be applied in order to analyse further the evidence to be correlated 
and further assessed. This element is new. 
 
 
Figure 49 - CrosscheckScheme element 
 
The CrosscheckScheme element, as shown in Figure 49, includes a DataExploration sub-
element and an optional FurtherExploration sub-element. The DataExploration sub-element is 
mandatory and includes the conditions for cross-checking evidence collected through monitoring 
and testing. The FurtherExploration sub-element contains the conditions for exploring further 
testing and monitoring cases when violations persist, enabling the expression of sub-periods. 
These sub-elements are analysed below. 
The DataExploration element includes the following elements: 
• the CrossCheckDescription element (Figure 50) which is of string type and includes a 
general description of the evidence that needs to be cross-checked.  
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Figure 50 - CrossCheckDescription sub-element 
  
For example, if I want to certify the availability security property (i.e. the ability of a 
TOC to produce a non-faulty response within a certain period of time) I will measure the 
percentage of calls that satisfy this condition over an assessment period. An independent 
hybrid model for the certification of TOC availability could be based on collecting 
evidence regarding the availability of a TOC through monitoring and testing 
independently (i.e., without any of these activities being triggered by outcomes of the 
other). This example in XML is given below: 
<CrossCheckDescription>	compare	the	percentage	of	calls	where	a	non-faulty	response	is	produced	
throughmonitoring	and	testing	</CrossCheckDescription>												
 
• the ComparePerformanceValues element (Figure 51), which is of 
ComparePerformanceValuesType and allows the comparison of the absolute difference 
between the monitoring and the testing performance values and a value that indicates the 
maximum accepted difference between the testing and monitoring evidence, for which 
the evidence will be considered valid. 
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Figure 51 - ComparePerformanceValues sub-element 
 
When I want to certify the availability security property and I compare the percentage of 
calls where a non-faulty response is produced through monitoring and testing, an 
availability measure based on testing (or monitoring) evidence will be used for issuing a 
certificate only if the availability measure based on monitoring (or testing) evidence over 
the same period is no more than 1% different from it.   
<ComparePerformanceValues>	
						<ArithmeticOperator>LESS-THAN-EQUAL-TO</ArithmeticOperator>	
											<ValueComparisonExpression	relation="ABSOLUTE-VALUE">	
																	<ArithmeticOperator>MINUS</ArithmeticOperator>																										
																	<MonitoringPerformanceValue>	</MonitoringPerformanceValue>	
																	<TestingPerformanceValue>	</TestingPerformanceValue>	
												</ValueComparisonExpression>	
						<MaximumValue>0.01</MaximumValue>	
</ComparePerformanceValues>	
 
• the SufficientMutualObservedPeriodsSatisfaction sub-element (Figure 52), which 
specifies the period where testing and monitoring are performed in parallel, and 
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compares it with a specific value. It is of 
SufficientMutualObservedPeriodsSatisfactionType and the definition is given below. 
 
 
Figure 52 - SufficientMutualObservedPeriodsSatisfaction element 
 
An example of the sub-element above is described here. When I certify the availability 
security property and I cross-check monitoring and testing evidence, one way of 
correlating evidence is to consider the testing events as valid evidence of TOC 
availability only if they were performed during the range [tmon, tmon] and the mutual 
observed time where testing and monitoring took place in parallel was more than 5200 
seconds.  
<SufficientMutualObservedPeriodsSatisfaction	PeriodUnit="seconds">	
									<ArithmeticOperator>GREATER-THAN-EQUAL-TO</ArithmeticOperator>	
									<MutuallyObservedPeriod>	</MutuallyObservedPeriod>	
									<ComparedValue>5200.00</ComparedValue>	
</SufficientMutualObservedPeriodsSatisfaction>	
 
• the CrossCheckStatus sub-element (Figure 53), which describes if the cross-checking is 
successful or if evidence is violated and more testing and monitoring cases are required. 
The values of this element can be “CROSS-CHECKING-SUCCESSFUL” if the 
conditions above are satisfied or “EVIDENCE-VIOLATED” if the conditions above are 
not satisfied. 
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Figure 53 - CrossCheckStatus sub-element 
 
The FurtherExploration sub-element (Figure 54) contains the AssessmentTimeExploration sub-
element and describes the expression of sub-periods. This specific element is particularly 
important to check if there are time patterns that underpin violations and inconsistencies between 
testing and monitoring evidence. This element contains the AssessmentTimeExploration sub-
element, as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 54 - FurtherExploration element 
 
The AssessmentTimeExploration sub-element (Figure 55) contains the TestingPeriodSplit sub-
element that helps us specify the division of the testing period into smaller sub-periods, the 
MonitoringPeriodSplit sub-element that helps us specify the division of the monitoring period 
into smaller sub-periods and the checkSufficiencyConditions sub-element. The 
AssessmentTimeExploration sub-element allows different splits of the monitoring and testing 
periods. After splitting the assessment periods into smaller sub-periods, I will check the 
sufficiency conditions of the evidence in order to explore if there are time patterns underpinning 
the deviations. 
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Figure 55 - AssessmentTimeExploration element 
 
An example of the sub-element above is provided at this point. If I want to certify the 
availability security property and the ability of a TOC to produce a non-faulty response within a 
certain period of time and there are deviations between the percentage of calls that satisfy this 
condition over an assessment period, concerning the evidence collected through monitoring and 
testing, I can shorten the testing period by x time units, and the monitoring period by y time 
units, to check if the deviations will persist. This action will allow the discovery of time patterns. 
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This can be very useful when, for instance, I observe that the availability is very low at specific 
periods of time. So, in this case, by splitting the time periods I can make further explorations. It 
is very important the fact that the model allows the expression of different sub-periods for 
monitoring and testing, as at a specific time period, it might be possible to collect enough 
evidence of one mode of assessment, but the collection of evidence for the sub-ordinate form of 
assessment may be impossible. If, for example, I split the monitoring and testing period evenly, 
but with testing I collect sufficient evidence and with monitoring I do not manage to collect the 
sufficient number of monitoring evidence, then I can further split the monitoring period to check 
time patterns. According to the following example, I shorten the testing period by 5 second and 
the monitoring period by 10 seconds and then I check if the evidence sufficiency conditions are 
satisfied. 
<AssessmentTimeExploration>	
																<TestingPeriodSplit>	
																				<SplitFromTime>	
																								<time>	
																												<varName>seconds</varName>	
																												<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																								</time>	
																				</SplitFromTime>	
																				<SplitToTime>	
																								<time>	
																												<varName>seconds</varName>	
																												<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																								</time>	
																								<Expression>	
																												<minus>5</minus>	
																								</Expression>	
																				</SplitToTime>	
																</TestingPeriodSplit>	
																<MonitoringPeriodSplit>	
																				<SplitFromTime>	
																								<time>	
																												<varName>seconds</varName>	
																												<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																								</time>	
																				</SplitFromTime>	
																				<SplitToTime>	
																								<time>	
																												<varName>seconds</varName>	
																												<varType>TimeVariable</varType>	
																								</time>	
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																								<Expression>	
																												<minus>10</minus>	
																								</Expression>	
																				</SplitToTime>	
																</MonitoringPeriodSplit>	
																<checkSufficiencyConditions	Id="Id14">…</checkSufficiencyConditions>	
</AssessmentTimeExploration>	
 
 
3.6 Architecture of the proposed framework for implementation 
The architecture for hybrid certification will be an extension of the existing architecture that has 
been developed for the CUMULUS project and is defined in [168]. Below, I will present an 
overview of the architecture and I will describe the main components that are required for the 
realisation of hybrid certification. The interfaces for the Certification Manager, Certification 
Communicator, Monitoring Manager, Monitoring Module, Testing Manager and Testing Module 
are already implemented for the CUMULUS project, so these interfaces will not be presented 
here. The components that I introduce are the Hybrid Manager, the Hybrid Certification 
Generator Attestation, the Hybrid Lifecycle Manager, the Hybrid Aggregator, the Hybrid 
Evidences database, the Hybrid Certification Models database and the Hybrid Certificates 
database. These components represent my contribution concerning the architecture of the 
CUMULUS framework. The architecture for hybrid certification is shown in Figure 56, and is 
based on the CUMULUS Framework Prototype Architecture Figure 56 - Architecture for Hybrid 
Certification[168]-Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56 - Architecture for Hybrid Certification 
 
 111 
 
• Certification Manager 
This component is responsible for communicating with the actors to create or modify the 
certification models and will start the certification process by delegating the appropriate 
managers. 
 
• Certificate Communicator 
This component is responsible for communicating with the actors who requested a certificate, for 
sending them the certificate and for notifying them if there is an update about changes in the 
certificate. 
 
• Monitoring Manager 
This component is responsible for detecting the availability of the monitoring infrastructure, for 
assembling and configuring the infrastructure, for initiating the monitoring process, for 
collecting the monitoring evidence and for aggregating them. 
	
• Monitoring Module 
This component is responsible for monitoring the events for a specific security property and 
Target of Certification (TOC). 
 
• Testing Manager 
This component is responsible for receiving inputs from various actors, starting the certification 
process and delegating the Testing Module to perform the tests. 
 
• Testing Module 
This component is responsible for performing tests on the TOC for a specific property and 
receiving the set of results. 
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• Hybrid  Manager 
This component is responsible for collecting all the evidence for hybrid certification and 
communicates with the Testing Manager and the Monitoring Manager through the Certification 
Communicator. The Hybrid Manager will decide how the different types of evidence will be 
combined and how, based on the information that is defined in the Certification Model. The 
specifications and the operations provided by this component are presented below. 
 
Hybrid Manager API 
Operation Description 
submitCertificationModel 
(String model) 
This method allows submitting a certification model to the 
Hybrid Manager 
Parametres 
model String String representation of the XML certification model 
Table 2 - Hybrid Manager API 
 
• Hybrid Certification Generator Attestation (Hybrid Generator Attestation) 
This component is responsible for generating a certificate when enough data are collected 
through monitoring and testing. More specifically, this component receives the certification 
model from the Certification Manager through the Generation API and creates the certificate if 
the sufficiency conditions are fulfilled and if the expiration and violation conditions are not 
reached. Additionally, this component stores the hybrid certificates issued in the Hybrid 
Certificates DB. The specifications and the operations provided by this component are presented 
below. 
 
Generation API 
Operation Description 
submitCertificationModel 
(String model) 
This method allows submitting a certification model to the 
Certificate Generator 
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Generation API 
Operation Description 
Parametres 
model String String representation of the XML certification model 
Table 3 - Generation API 
 
The Hybrid Certification Generator Attestation includes the Hybrid Lifecycle Manager that is 
described below. 
 
• Hybrid Lifecycle Manager 
This component is responsible for defining all the states and the transitions in the certification 
model. Additionally, it contains information about the conditions for lifecycle transitions, 
indicating under what conditions the states will be reached and how they will be altered. This 
Lifecycle model is different from the one used in Monitoring-based certification and the one 
used in Test-based certification as presented in the CUMULUS project, since I have introduced 
the elements for cross-checking and analysing evidence. 
 
• Hybrid Aggregator (Hybrid Aggregation Manager) 
This component is responsible for aggregating the hybrid results collected in order to issue a 
certificate. This component aggregates monitoring and testing results and stores them in the 
“Hybrid Evidences DB” of the framework, as required by the given certification model. The 
aggregation manager polls the detailed evidence at regular intervals. 
 
• Dashboard 
This component provides the user a web-based frond-end interface for requesting the generation 
of a certificate or for retrieving a specific certificate from the framework. 
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• Hybrid Evidences DB 
This component records the aggregated evidence according to the Hybrid Aggregator and is 
inserted in the certificates. This component is new and is based on the common structure of the 
Monitoring and Testing evidences databases. 
 
Hybrid Evidences DB 
Element Description 
AggregatedEvents_Id Id of the aggregated evidence 
CM_Instance_Id Id of the Certification model instance 
Creation_Time The time the aggregated evidence was created 
Start_Time The time the aggregation period started 
End_Time The time the aggregation period ended 
Assertion_Id The Id of the assertion of the security property 
Result The result that expresses violation or satisfaction 
Evidence_XML Aggregated evidence as XML 
Evidence_JAVA Aggregated evidence as JAVA object 
Table 4 - Hybrid Evidences Database 
 
• Hybrid Cert Models DB 
This component keeps a record of all certification models created. This component is new and is 
based on the common structure of the Monitoring and Testing certification models databases. 
Hybrid Cert Models DB 
Element Description 
CM_Id Id of the certification model 
CM_Instance_Id Id of the Certification model instance 
CA_Signature The signature of the certification authority 
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Hybrid Cert Models DB 
Element Description 
Security property The definition of the security property 
Assertion_Id The Id of the assertion of the security property 
Assertion The specification of the security property 
TOC_Name The name of the TOC 
Toc_Id The ID of the TOC 
Evidence_XML Aggregated evidence as XML 
Evidence_JAVA Aggregated evidence as JAVA object 
Table 5 - Hybrid Certification Models Database 
 
• Hybrid Certs DB 
This component keeps a record of all generated certificates. This component is new and is based 
on the common structure of the Monitoring and Testing certificates databases. 
Hybrid Certs DB 
Element Description 
certId Id of the certificate 
Cert_SerialNo Serial Number of the certificate 
Security property The definition of the security property 
TOC_Name The name of the TOC 
Valid_From Date when the certificate starts to be valid 
Valid_Until Date when the certificate stops to be valid 
certString The certificate as a sting represented in XML 
certObject The certificate as a JAVA object 
Table 6 - Hybrid Certificates Database 
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3.7 Flow of Action 
At this section I will present the sequence diagram for issuing a certificate. 
 
 
Figure 57 - Sequence Diagram for Issuing a Hybrid Certificate 
 
When the user of the tool requests a certificate, then the Certificate Manager starts the 
certification process and delegates the Hybrid Manager to communicate with the Testing 
Manager and the Monitoring Manager in order to collect all the information for hybrid 
certification. The Hybrid Manager sends a request to the Testing Manager to collect the testing 
evidence. When it receives the testing evidence, the Hybrid Manager sends a request to the 
Hybrid Aggregation Manager to store the testing evidence and also sends a request to the 
Monitoring Manager to collect the monitoring evidence. When the Monitoring Manager 
responds to the Hybrid Manager, then, the Hybrid Manager sends a request to the Hybrid 
Aggregation Manager to store the monitoring evidence. The Hybrid Aggregation Manager will 
send a request to the Hybrid Lifecycle Manager, which defines the status of the certificate. 
Finally, if a certificate can be issued, the Certificate Generator Attestation will issue a certificate. 
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3.8 Hybrid, independent mode model (using EC-Assertion) 
The following example shows the use of a hybrid approach in certifying cloud service 
availability using EC-Assertion. As defined in [160], this property expresses the ability of a TOC 
to produce a non-faulty response within a certain period of time and is measured by the 
percentage of calls that satisfy this condition over an assessment period. An independent hybrid 
model for the certification of TOC availability could be based on collecting evidence regarding 
the availability of a TOC through monitoring and testing independently (i.e., without any of 
these activities being triggered by outcomes of the other) and then correlating and cross-
checking the collected pools of evidence to produce a hybrid assessment of the property. More 
specifically, the hybrid model could include monitoring formulas to record instances of 
invocation of TOC operators where TOC produced a response within the acceptable time limit 
and the instances where it did not, and keep a record of counters of these instances from which 
an overall availability measure could be drawn. The formulas that could be used to collect this 
monitoring evidence are as follows: 
 
Assumption	A1	(monitoring	evidence):	
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,REQ,_OP(_data),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])^		
Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_CA,RES,_OP(_data),_TOC),	t2,[t1,t1+tav])	^	
HoldsAt(MCounterA(_TOC,_MCA),t2)	
⇒	
Terminates(_e1,MCounterA(_TOC,	_MCA),	t2)	^			
Initiates(_e1,MCounterA(_TOC,	_MCA+1),	t2)^		
Initiates(_e1,MAvail(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1),	t2)		
	
Assumption	A2	(monitoring	evidence):	
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,REQ,_OP(_data),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])^	
¬	Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_CA,RES,_OP(_data),_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+tav]))^	
HoldsAt(MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU),	t2)		
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⇒	
Terminates(_e1,MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU),	t2)	^	
Initiates(_e1,MCounterU(_TOC,	_MCU+1),	t2)	^	
Initiates(_e1,MUnav(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1),t2)		
 
The first of the above monitoring formulas (i.e., assumption A1) monitors calls to any operation 
in a _TOC and the responses to them (see events Happens(e(_e1,	 _CA,	 _TOC,	 REQ,	
_OP(_data),_TOC),	t1,	R(t1,t1)) and Happens(e(_e2,	_CA,	_TOC,	RES,	_OP(_data),	_TOC),	
t2,[t1,t1+tav])) and if a response is within the required period (tav), it updates the counter of 
instances where _TOC was available and records the related call (in fluents 
MCounterA(_TOC,_MCA,t2) and MAvail(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1), respectively). The second 
formula (i.e., assumption A2) monitors calls to _TOC operations that did not produce a response 
within the required time, and keeps an overall counter of unavailability and the related calls in 
fluents MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU,t2) and	MUnav(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1). 
The hybrid model for the certification of availability could also incorporate a test-based 
availability assessment sub-model. This sub-model can execute a randomly selected operation in 
the interface of _TOC periodically to check its availability, and keep a record of instances of test-
triggered invocations of operations of the TOC in which a response was produced within the 
required time period, and instances of test-triggered invocations where it was not. 
This sub-model is expressed by the following formulas for collecting testing evidence: 
 
Assumption	A3	(testing	evidence):	
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,	EXC(Tper),	_x=random(interface(_TOC)),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])	
^	
Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,	_CA	RES,_x,_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+tav])^	
HoldsAt(TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA),t2)	
⇒		
Terminates(_e1,TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA),t2)	^			
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Initiates(_e1,TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA+1),t2)^		
Initiates(_e1,TAvail(_TOC,_x,t2–t1),t2)		
	
Assumption	A4	(testing	evidence):	
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,	EXC(Tper),	_x=random(interface(_TOC)),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])	
^	
¬	Happens(e(_e2,	_TOC,	_CA,	RES,_x,_TOC),t2,	[t1,t1+tav])^	
HoldsAt(TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU),t2)		
⇒	
Terminates(_e1,TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU),t2)	^	
Initiates(_e1,TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU+1),t2)	^	
Initiates(_e1,TUnav(_TOC,_x,	t2–t1),t2)		
 
A3 and A4 are similar to assumptions A1 and A2 respectively except that, instead of monitoring 
real operation calls, they execute a randomly selected operation in the interface of _TOC 
periodically (see the event Happens	 (e	 (_e1,	 _CA,	 _TOC,	 EXC(Tper),	 _x=random	
(interface(_TOC)),	_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])) to check its availability, and update fluents recording 
the overall counters of availability and unavailability of _TOC	and the test executions that revealed 
them.  
In the hybrid model, the assumption pairs (A1, A2), and (A3, A4) are used to collect evidence 
independently without any monitoring events triggering tests or vice versa. However, it might 
still be desirable to correlate the testing and monitoring evidence, according to the hybrid 
certification model schema I have introduced. The overall availability measure may be computed 
on the basis of combining both test and monitoring evidence as A = (_MCA + _TCA)/(_MCA+ 
_TCA+_MCU+ _TCU), so an aggregate assessment is formulated from both monitoring and 
testing evidence.  Concerning the evidence sufficiency conditions, I will check if the monitoring 
period is greater than the minimum monitoring period required and if the testing period is greater 
than the minimum testing period required. Additionally, I will check if the number of the 
monitoring and testing events is greater than the minimum number of monitoring and testing 
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events. Concerning the cross-check conditions, I will compare the monitoring and testing 
assessment period against the minimum assessment period required for this property and I will 
check if the absolute value of the difference between the _MCA and _TCA is greater than a 
minimum value defined for this property. If the above conditions are not satisfied then I will 
revoke the certificate.  If violations persist, I will consider extending the assessment period and 
collecting more testing and monitoring events. Furthermore, I can split the monitoring and testing 
periods into smaller sub-periods and I can check again the sufficiency conditions of the evidence 
in order to understand if there are time patterns underpinning the deviations. 
It becomes clear that in this example of independent hybrid certification, where testing and 
monitoring take place independently, without having one form of assessment triggered by the 
outcomes of the other form, I will capture more cases than performing only testing or only 
monitoring (Figure 58). Consequently, with testing I can discover cases that might have escaped 
monitoring and vice versa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58 - Cases covered by Independent-mode Certification Models 
 
Examples of Hybrid, independent-mode model cases 
Below I will present the hybrid independent-mode certification models of certain security 
properties as defined in [160]. These hybrid models will verify either the completeness or the 
trustworthiness of the assessment. 
 
  
Monitoring Testing 
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HTTP to HTTPS redirection  
This security property corresponds to the AIS:authentication:network-authenticated-server-
access security property in [160]. The TOC provides a communication channel between a client 
and itself, which offers the following guarantees: 
(1) The client receives assurance that he is communicating with the TOC. 
(2) The integrity of the exchange of data between the client and the TOC is protected with 
guarantees between exchanged messages. 
The property is considered as verified if the client communicates with a webserver (TOC) using 
SSL/TLS and verifies the authenticity of the webserver with a certificate, providing adequate 
encryption. This security property guarantees that HTTP requests are redirected to HTTPS and 
that the network channel is confidential, verifying the authenticity of the user and the web 
server. Every time there is a request call from a client to a webserver (HTTPserver) and the 
request for data transmission is to port 80 which indicates an unsecure communication, then the 
monitor will check for the existence of another event that will contain the response of the web 
server back to the client, notifying the execution of the redirection to the HTTPS port (port 443). 
The “location” attribute contains the location header which is a string that indicates if there is 
redirection to the HTTPS port, the “HTTPStatus” attribute which includes the status code of the 
response and the “serverAddress” attribute which indicates the number of the port.  
HTTPS (HTTP over SSL or HTTP Secure) is the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) as a sublayer under regular HTTP application layering. HTTPS encrypts 
and decrypts user page requests as well as the pages that are returned by the web server. The use 
of HTTPS protects against eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. HTTPS and SSL 
support the use of X.509 digital certificates from the server so that, if necessary, a user can 
authenticate the sender. Unless a different port is specified, HTTPS uses port 443 instead of 
HTTP port 80 in its interactions with the lower layer, TCP/IP. The security of HTTPS is 
therefore that of the underlying TLS, which uses long-term public and secret keys to exchange a 
short-term session key to encrypt the data flow between client and server [169]. 
The monitoring rules below will demonstrate that the TOC redirects every HTTP request to 
HTTPS every time I see a response from the webserver to the client where (_location2	 =	
locationHTTPS)	and	(_HTTPStatus2	=	RedirectStatus).	Also, the rule demonstrates that the 
TOC provides a secure communication (SSL/TLS connection) between the client and the server 
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of the communication. The SSL/TLS encryption validation will verify the presence of SSL/TSL 
channel encryption.  
	
	
Rule	R1	(monitoring	evidence):	
Happens	 (e(_e1,	 _client,	 _webserver,	 REQ,	 _httpCall(location,	 _serverAddress,	
_HTTPStatus),	_webserver),t1,	[t1,t1])		^	
	
(_serverAddress	=	port80)	
		
⇒	
	
Happens	 (e(_e2,	 _webserver,	 _client,	 RES,	 _httpCall(_location2,	
_serverAddress2,	_HTTPStatus2),	_webserver),t2,	[t1,t1+tav])		^	
	
(_location2	=	locationHTTPS)	^	
	
(_HTTPStatus2	=	RedirectStatus)	^	
	
(_serverAddress	=	port443)	
	
	
With testing, I will verify that every time I force data transmission to a webserver through port 
80, the TOC provides secure communication by redirecting to the HTTPS port (port 443) and by 
verifying the presence and the robustness of the SSL/TSL channel encryption (by executing the 
_dataTransmit operation). 
	
Rule	R2	(testing	evidence):	
Happens	 (e(_e1,	 _AI,	 _webserver,	 EXC(Tper),	 _dataTransmit(_encrCode,	
_serverAddress	),	_webserver)	,t1,	[t1,t1])		^	
	
(_serverAddress	=	port80)	
	
⇒	
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Happens	 (e(_e2,	 _webserver,	 _AI,	 RES,	 _dataTransmit(_encrCodeVerified,	 _	
serverAddress2),	_webserver),t2,	[t1,t1+tav])		^	
	
(_encrCodeVerified	≠Nil)	^	
	
(_serverAddress2	=	port443)	
 
If with testing I cannot confirm the redirection to the HTTPS port (port 443), then the hybrid 
certificate will be revoked and I will proceed to data exploration. If violations persist, I will 
proceed to further exploration. This means that I can extend the assessment period or I can split 
the monitoring and testing periods into smaller sub-periods to check if there are time patterns 
underpinning these deviations. 
 
Percentage of timely incident reports 	
This security property corresponds to the SEF:incident-management-quality:percentage-of-
timely-incident-reports security property in [160]. This security property describes the 
percentage of incidents that are reported within a predefined time limit after their discovery, over 
the total number of incidents discovered. The independent hybrid model will prove the 
trustworthiness of outcomes from testing and monitoring. The attribute “maxtime” indicates the 
maximum reporting time limit. This security property is based on the Protection Profile (PP) 
developed by Common Criteria and applies to encrypted personal storage devices used for 
temporary storage of data whilst the data is in transit between two trusted host computers 
[164][170]. The test-based sub-model will execute periodically the _uploadData operation, and 
keep a record of instances of test-triggered invocations of operations of TOE in which a response 
was produced within the required time period, and instances of test-triggered invocations where 
it was not. 
	
Assumption	A5	(testing	evidence):	
Happens	(e(_e1,_CA,_TOE,	EXC(Tper),	_uploadData(_username,_usersecret,_data,	
_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t1,	[t1,t1])		^		
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOE,_CA,	RES,	_uploadData(_vusername,_vusersecret,_data,	
_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t2,	[t1,t2])		^	
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(	t2-t1	<=_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(TCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCTI),t2)		
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,	TCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCTI),t2)	^	
Initiates	(_e1,	TCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCTI+1),t2)	
 
and 
Assumption	A6	(testing	evidence):	
Happens	(e(_e1,_CA,_TOE,	EXC(Tper),	_uploadData(_username,_usersecret,_data,	
_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t1,	[t1,t1])		^		
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOE,_CA,	RES,	_uploadData(_vusername,_vusersecret,_data,	
_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t2,	[t1,t2])		^	
(	t2-t1	>_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(TCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCNTI),t2)		
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,	TCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCNTI),t2)	^	
Initiates	(_e1,	TCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,_TCNTI+1),t2)	
 
The percentage of timely incidents using testing evidence will be calculated using the following 
formula: 
Percentage of Timely Incidents (Testing) = TCTI/(TCTI +TCNTI) 
The hybrid model will include monitoring formulas to record instances of invocation of TOE 
operators where TOE produced a response within the acceptable time limit and the instances 
where it did not, and will keep a record of counters of these instances from which an overall 
availability measure could be drawn. 
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Assumption	A7	(monitoring	evidence):	
Happens	(e(_e1,_sc,_TOE,REQ,	_uploadData	_username,	_usersecret,	_verCode1,	
_data,	_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),t1,[t1,t1])	^	
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOE,_sc,	RES,	_uploadData(_vusername,	_vusersecret,	_verCode2,	
_data,	_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t2,[t1,t2])	^		
(	t2-t1	<=_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(MCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,_MCTI),t2)	
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,MCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCTI),	t2)	^			
Initiates	(_e1,MCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCTI+1),	t2)		
	
And 
Assumption	A8	(monitoring	evidence):	
Happens	(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,	_uploadData(_username,	_usersecret,	_verCode1,	
_data,	_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),t1,[t1,t1])	^	
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOC,_sc,	RES,	_uploadData(_vusername,	_vusersecret,	_verCode2,	
_data,	_startTime,	_endTime),_TOE),	t2,[t1,t2])	^		
(	t2-t1	>_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,_MCNTI),t2)	
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCNTI),	t2)	^			
Initiates	(_e1,MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCNTI+1),	t2)		
 
The percentage of timely incidents using monitoring evidence will be calculated using the 
following formula: 
 
Percentage of Timely Incidents (Monitoring) = MCTI/(MCTI +MCNTI) 
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After calculating the percentage of timely incident reports based on monitoring data and the 
percentage of timely incident reports based on testing data, I will use the two different 
percentages and I will compare the absolute value of their difference with a predefined 
performance value for this security property. Additionally, the monitoring period along with the 
testing period will be compared with the minimum assessment period required. If the following 
conditions are not satisfied or if the ratio of violations to satisfactions of testing or monitoring 
data is bigger than a specific percentage, then I will revoke the certificate.   
It is worth mentioning that in the event of conflicts, the tool provides the option of retrieving the 
events that raised the conflicts so that the user can decide if they want to proceed with conflicts 
resolution when these can be resolved. After the evidence polling, the user can analyse the 
evidence from monitoring and testing to check which ones are conflicting. The overall 
percentage of timely incidents can be computed on the basis of both test and monitoring evidence 
as Hybrid Percentage = [ Percentage of Timely Incidents (Monitoring) + Percentage of Timely 
Incidents (Testing) ] / 2, so aggregate assessments based on each type of evidence may be 
validated against an aggregate assessment based on the other type before issuing a certificate. A 
measure based on testing evidence can be used for issuing a certificate only if the availability 
measure based on monitoring evidence over the same period is no more than 1% different from it. 
If violations persist, I will consider extending the assessment period and collecting more testing 
and monitoring events. Furthermore, I can split the monitoring and testing periods into smaller 
sub-periods and I can check again the sufficiency conditions of the evidence in order to check if 
there are time patterns underpinning the deviations. 
The above hybrid formulas guarantee incident management quality by enabling the calculation 
of the percentage of timely incidents for a given target of evaluation. In this example the 
contribution of the independent-mode hybrid approach to the Protection Profile is of great 
importance, as the results of testing will confirm and complement the results from monitoring. 
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3.9 Hybrid, dependent mode model (using EC-Assertion) 
The following example shows the use of a hybrid approach in certifying data integrity-at-rest 
using EC-Assertion. As defined in [160], this property expresses the ability to detect and report 
any alteration of stored data in a target of certification (TOC).  
To demonstrate the difference between monitoring and hybrid certification models, I first 
present the monitoring certification model for data integrity-at-rest, expressed by the 
EC_Assertion monitoring rule R3 that is listed below. The specification of this rule as well as all 
models in the paper, assumes the following agents and variables denoting them: service 
consumers (_sc), target of certification (_TOC), authentication infrastructure (_AI), certification 
authority (_CA). 
 
Rule	R3:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,	_updOp(_cred,_data,_auth),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])	^		
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOC,_AI,RES,	_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode),_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+d1])	^		
(_vCode	≠	Nil)		
⇒	
Happens	(e(_e3,_TOC,_AI,REQ,	_notifO(_cred,_data,_auth,_h),_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2])	
	
According to R3 when a call of an update operation in a _TOC is detected at some time point t1 
(see event Happens(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,	 _updOp	 (_cred,_data,_auth),	 _TOC),t1,[t1,t1])) 
and a response to this call occurs after it (see event Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_AI,RES,	
_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode),	 _TOC),	 t2,	 [t1,t1+d1])) indicating that the request has been 
granted (see condition (_vCode	 ≠	 Nil) in the rule), the monitor should also check for the 
existence of another event showing the call of an operation in some authorisation agent _A to 
notify the receipt and execution of the update request (see Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_AI,REQ,	
_notifO(_cred,_data,_auth,_h),_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2])).  
The above model has two limitations in providing assurance for the integrity-at-rest property: (1) 
it cannot capture updates of data that might have been carried out without using the update 
interface assumed of _TOC (i.e., _updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode)), and (2) it cannot check that the 
operation _updOp has checked authorisation rights before updating data. 
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A hybrid model could be used in this case to overcome partially the first of these limitations. 
More specifically, a hybrid model in this case could be based on periodic testing to detect if 
stored data have been modified and monitor the periods between the tests that revealed data 
modifications to check if appropriate notifications have also been sent. Data modifications could 
be detected by obtaining the hash value of the relevant data file in the TOC periodically. Then, if 
across the execution of two consecutive tests, the last retrieved hash value of the file is different 
from the previous hash value, a data modification action can be deduced. In parallel with the 
execution of this periodic test, the hybrid model will also monitor the execution of notification 
operations. Hence, when a data modification action is detected by two consecutive tests, the 
hybrid model could also check whether a correlated notification operation has been executed 
within the period between the tests.  
 
Testing triggers Monitoring  
This hybrid model for this instantaneous property that will cover the trustworthiness of outcomes 
can be expressed using the following monitoring rule and assumption: 
	
Rule	R4:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,EXC(Tper),	_getHash(_TOC,_file,_h1),_CA),	t1,	[t1,t1])	^		
HoldsAt	(LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1)	^		
(_h1	≠	_h2)		
⇒		
Happens	(e(_e3,_TOC,_CA,REQ,	_notifO(_cred,_data,	_auth,_h1),_TOC),t3,[t2,t1])	
Assumption	A9:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,REQ,	_getHash(_TOC,_file,_h1),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])		^		
HoldsAt	(LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1)	^		
(_h1	≠	_h2)		
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1)	^	
	
Initiates	(_e1,LastHash(_file,_h1,t1),t1)	
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Rule R4 is “hybrid” as it includes normal monitoring events (i.e., REQ and RES events) and 
events that trigger the execution of tests (i.e., EXC events). R6 expresses a hybrid dependent 
mode model where evidence arising from testing triggers the acquisition of monitoring evidence. 
Hence, testing is the primary form of assessment. In particular, R4 forces the execution of the 
event Happens	(e	(_e1,	_CA	,	_TOC,	EXC	(Tper),	_getHash	(_TOC,	_file,	_h1),	_CA),	t1,	
[t1,t1])	 periodically every Tper time units to invoke the operation _getHash in the testing 
interface of _TOC and obtain the current hash value (_h1) of the data file (_file) of _TOC. If this 
value is different from the hash value recorded by a previous test at some t2 (i.e., the value 
recorded in the fluent LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1), rule R6 checks if an update notification has 
also occurred between t2 and t1, as expressed by the monitoring event Happens(e	(_e3,	_TOC,	
_CA,REQ,	_notifO	(_cred,	_data,	_auth,	_h1),	_TOC),	t3,	[t2,t1]). The hybrid model uses 
also a monitoring assumption (i.e., A9). This assumption is used in the model to update the hash 
value recorded in the fluent LastHash, if a test retrieves a hash value that is different from the last 
recorded one. 
Although the above model can capture data updates that have taken place without the invocation 
of the file updating interface, it cannot guarantee that it can capture all possible updates that 
might have taken place. In particular, it won't be able to detect if more than one updates have 
taken place between two consecutive executions of the periodic test. Hence, it addresses the first 
of the limitations of the monitoring problem (i.e., limitation (1)) only partially. 
 
Monitoring triggers Testing  
To address the second limitation of the monitoring model (i.e. it cannot check that the operation 
_updOp has checked authorisation rights before updating data), it is possible to construct a 
different hybrid model. This model could rely on testing to ensure that every time that an agent 
that requests a data alteration, it has the authorisation right to do the requested alteration. This 
model can be expressed by the monitoring rule below:  
Rule	R5:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,	_updOp(_cred,_data,	_auth),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])		^		
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOC,_AI,RES,_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode1),_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+d1])	^	
(_vCode1	≠	Nil)		
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⇒	
Happens	(e(_e3,_CA,_AI,EXC,_authorO(_cred,_auth,_vCode2),_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2])^	
(_vCode2≠Nil)	
 
Rule R5 monitors requests for updates of _TOC data through its normal updating interface. 
However, for every such request that is granted by _TOC, it requests the execution of a test to 
check if the entity that requested the update had indeed the authorisation to update data. This is 
expressed by the EXC event Happens(e	 (_e3,	 _CA,	 _AI,	 EXC,	 _authorO	 (_cred,	 _auth,	
_verCode2),	 _TOC)	 ,t3,	 [t2,t2+d2])) and the condition (_verCode2	 ≠	 Nil). In R3, the 
monitoring evidence triggers the execution of tests. Hence, the rule expresses a dependent hybrid 
model where monitoring is the primary form of assessment. Rules R4 and R5 are examples of 
general time correlation structures that may arise in dependent hybrid certification model and 
which are shown in Figure 58. 
Part (a) of the figure shows dependent hybrid certification models where testing is the dominant 
form of assessment. In such models, test plans each consisting of a series of tests (i.e., 
{Testn1,…,TestnL}) are executed according to some periodic schedule. Assuming that the 
execution of a test plan starts at ts(n) and ends at te(n), the hybrid model may also check for 
monitoring events that occurred within the interval [ts(n)–d1, te(n)+d2] in order to provide an 
assessment of the security property of interest. Note that the length of the execution of each test 
plan and the monitoring events found within [ts(n)–d1, te(n)+d2]  may vary. 
 
 
 
Figure 59 - Dependent mode hybrid certification models 
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Part (b) of the figure shows the timelines of evidence collection in dependent hybrid certification 
models where monitoring is the dominant form of assessment. In such models following the 
collection of monitoring evidence (events), tests plans are executed to cross-check/complete it. 
The execution of these plans starts within the range [tm(n) , tm(n) +d] where tm(n) is the time of 
occurrence of the last event in a pattern of events that should trigger the execution of the plan 
and d is a period set by the model. The length of the execution of each test plan may vary. 
 
Examples of Hybrid, dependent mode model cases - Monitoring Triggers Testing  
Below, I will present the hybrid dependent-mode certification models of certain security 
properties from [160] where monitoring triggers testing. The hybrid models that will be used to 
assess the security properties will confirm the completeness of data collected or the 
trustworthiness of assessment. 
 
Percentage of timely incident reports	
This security property corresponds to SEF:incident-management-quality:percentage-of-timely-
incident-reports as defined in [160] and describes the percentage of incidents that are reported 
within a predefined time limit, over the total number of incidents discovered. In my example, I 
will monitor calls to upload data in the TOC and I will check which of the responses are timely, 
keeping a counter of the responses. The dependent hybrid model will prove the trustworthiness 
of outcomes from testing and monitoring. More specifically, testing will complement monitoring 
as it will check the authorisation rights of the agent who requested the uploadData operation. 
This security property has been also covered above by an independent hybrid certification 
model, but at this point I will show how it can be assessed with a hybrid dependent-mode model 
where monitoring is the dominant form of assessment. This security property is based on the 
Protection Profile (PP) developed by Common Criteria and applies to encrypted personal storage 
devices used for temporary storage of data whilst the data is in transit between two trusted host 
computers [164][170].  
Rule	R6:	
Happens	(e(_e1,	_sc,	_TOC,	REQ,	_uploadData	(_username,	_usersecret,	_data,	
_auth),	_TOC),	t1,	[t1,t1])	^	
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Happens	(e(_e2,	_TOC,	_AI,	RES,	_uploadData	(_vusername,	_vusersecret,	_data,	
_vCode),	_TOC),	t2,[t1,t2])	^		
(	_vCode	≠	Nil	)	^	
(t2-t1	<=_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(MCounterTimelyInc(_TOC,_MCTI),t2)	
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,MCounterTimelyInc(_TOC,	_MCTI),	t2)	^			
Initiates	(_e1,MCounterTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCTI+1),	t2)	^	
Happens	(e(_e3,	_AI,	_TOC,	EXC	(Tper),	_checkAuthor	(_username,	_usersecret,	
_auth,	_vCode2),	_TOE),	t3,[t2,t2+d1])	^	
(	_vCode2	≠	Nil	)	
and 
Rule	R7:	
Happens	(e(_e1,	_sc,	_TOC,	REQ,	_uploadData	(_username,	_usersecret,	_data,	
_auth),	_TOC),	t1,	[t1,t1])	^	
Happens	(e(_e2,	_TOC,	_AI,	RES,	_uploadData	(_vusername,	_vusersecret,	_data,	
_vCode),	_TOC),	t2,[t1,t2])	^		
(	_vCode	≠	Nil	)	^	
(t2-t1	>_maxtime)	^	
HoldsAt	(MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,_MCNTI),t2)	
⇒	
Terminates	(_e1,MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCNTI),	t2)	^			
Initiates	(_e1,MCounterNotTimelyInc(_TOE,	_MCNTI+1),	t2)	^	
Happens	(e(_e3,	_AI,	_TOC,	EXC	(Tper),	_checkAuthor	(_username,	_usersecret,	
_authcode,	_vCode2),	_TOE),	t3,[t2,t2+d1])	^	
(	_vCode2	≠	Nil	)	
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Rule R6 monitors calls to the _uploadData operation in the TOC and the responses to them, and 
if the time required for a response is less that the maxtime	and the fluent that keeps a counter of 
the responses that were produced on time holds, then it updates the counter of instances where 
the responses were timely and executes periodic testing to check that the agent who quested the 
data upload has the authorisation rights to do the operation. The second rule (Rule R7) keeps an 
overall counter of the non-timely incidents and executes periodic testing to check if the login 
operation has checked authorisation rights. The percentage of timely incidents using monitoring 
evidence will be calculated using the following formula: 
Percentage of Timely Incidents  = MCTI/(MCTI +MCNTI) 
The above hybrid formulas guarantee incident management quality by allowing the calculation 
of the hybrid percentage of the timely incidents for a given target of evaluation. In this example 
the contribution of the dependent-mode hybrid approach to the Protection Profile is of great 
importance, as the hybrid rules enable the authorisation of the agent who requested the 
_uploadData operation, providing a higher level of security. 
 
Authentication of data origin 
This security property corresponds to the AIS:authentication:authentication-of-data-origin 
security property as defined in [160] and describes a data authentication mechanism which 
assures that data produced by the TOE (Target of Evaluation) can be verified to originate from 
the TOE. The dependent hybrid model will prove the completeness of data from testing and 
monitoring. The property will be considered “verified” if the data produced by the TOC is 
associated with an Authentication Code (_authcode). If ((_authcode)≠ Nil) I can assume that 
data originates from the TOE. The TOE will be the “upgrade Web Interface”. The following rule 
R9, for every request to upgrade the TOE data (request granted by TOE), through the normal 
upgrade interface, it requests the execution of a test to check if the entity that requested the 
update had indeed the authorisation to upgrade data and that the data that originate from the TOE 
is associated with an _authcode whose value is not Nil. This security property is based on the 
Protection Profile (PP) developed by Common Criteria and applies to encrypted personal storage 
devices used for temporary storage of data whilst the data is in transit between two trusted host 
computers [164][170]. The hybrid formulas will certify the authentication of the TOE by using 
both testing and monitoring evidence. More specifically, evidence gathered from testing will 
complete the monitoring evidence gathered. 
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Rule	R9:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_sc,_TOE,REQ,	_upgradeOp(_username,	_usersecret,	_data,	
vCode),_TOE),t1,[t1,t1])		^		
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOE,_sc,	RES,	_upgradeOp(_vusername,	_vusersecret,	_data,	
_authcode),_TOE),t2,[t1,t1+d1])	^	
	(_authcode	≠	Nil)		
⇒	
Happens	(e(_e3,_CA,_AI,EXC,	_authenticateOp(_username,_usersecret,	_vCode,		
_authcode2),_TOE),t3,[t2,t2+d2])^	
(_authcode2≠Nil)	
In this dependent hybrid certification model, monitoring is the dominant form of assessment and 
the test plans are executed to check the authorisation rights of the entity who requested the 
upgrade. The execution of these plans starts within the range [t2,t2+d2] where t2 is the time of 
occurrence of the last event in a pattern of events that should trigger the execution of the plan 
and d2 is a period set by the model.  
	
Example of Hybrid, dependent mode model cases - Testing Triggers Monitoring 
Below, I will present the hybrid dependent-mode certification model for the Storage freshness 
security property from [160]. In this model testing is the primary form of assessment and triggers 
monitoring.  
Storage freshness  
This security property corresponds to the DSI:durability:storage-freshness security property as 
defined in [160] and assures that any attempt to retrieve a data object from storage in the TOC is 
guaranteed to return the updated version of the data object, reporting any alteration of the  data 
object. The dependent hybrid model will prove the trustworthiness of data. First of all, I will 
execute the update operation in the interface of the TOC and if a response is produced within a 
required time period, then the counter of instances where the data in the TOC were altered, is 
updated. Additionally, the fluent concerning the test executions that revealed the data alteration 
in the TOC is recorded. 
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Assumption	A10:	
Happens	 (e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,	 EXC(Tper),	 _update(_TOC,	 _object,	 _h1)	 ,	 _TOC),	 t1,	
[t1,t1])	^	
Happens	(e(_e2,_TOC,	_CA	RES,	_update(_TOC,_object,	_h2),_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+tav])^	
HoldsAt	(TCounterUpdate(_TOC,_TCU),t2)	
⇒		
Terminates	(_e1,TCounterUpdate(_TOC,_TCU),t2)	^			
Initiates	(_e1,TCounterUpdqate(_TOC,_TCU+1),t2)^		
Initiates	(_e1,TUpdate(_TOC,_x,t2–t1),t2)		
 
Also, with testing I will detect if data stored in the TOC have been modified and I will monitor 
the periods between the tests that revealed data modifications to check if appropriate 
notifications have also been sent. Data modifications could be detected by obtaining the hash 
value of the relevant data file in the TOC periodically. Then, if across the execution of two 
consecutive tests, the last retrieved hash value of the file is different from the previous hash 
value, a data modification action can be deduced. In parallel with the execution of this periodic 
test, the hybrid model will also monitor the execution of notification operations. 
	
Rule	R10:	
Happens	(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,	EXC(Tper),	_update(_TOC,_object,_h1),_CA),	t1,	
[t1,t1])		^		
HoldsAt	(LastHash(_object,_h2,t2),t1)	^		
(_h1	≠	_h2)	^		
(t2	<=	t1)	
⇒		
Happens	(e(_e3,_TOC,_CA,REQ,	_notifUpdate(_cred,_data,_auth,_h1),	_TOC),	t3,	
[t2,t1])	
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Rule R10 expresses a hybrid dependent mode model where evidence arising from testing 
triggers the acquisition of monitoring evidence. Hence, testing is the primary form of 
assessment. R10 forces the execution of the event Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,EXC(Tper),	
_update(_TOC,_object,_h1),_CA),	 t1,	 [t1,t1])  periodically to invoke the operation 
_update(_TOC,_object,_h1) in the testing interface of _TOC and obtain the current hash value 
(_h1) of the data object of the _TOC. If this value is different from the hash value recorded by a 
previous test at some t2 (i.e., the value recorded in the fluent	LastHash(_object,_h2,t2),t1),  
rule R11 checks if an update notification has also occurred between t2 and t1, as expressed by 
the monitoring event Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_CA,REQ,	 _notifUpdate(_cred,_data,_auth,_h1),	
_TOC),	t3,	[t2,t1]). 
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4. Evaluation 
4.1 Research methods and evaluation 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate critically the hybrid approach that I have introduced 
and to provide the reader with conclusions about the hybrid certification. The qualitative 
evaluation of my approach is based on comparing my hybrid model against other approaches 
that have extended industrial applicability, in terms of certain criteria that I am defining. The 
biggest strength of this method is the fact that my approach is compared against other popular 
approaches, so the advantages and the limitations of my hybrid solution are easily identified and 
revealed. However, this method is limited to a finite number of comparisons and, thus, entails a 
degree of subjectivity. 
 
4.2 Overview and evaluation assessment 
At this point, I will provide an evaluation of the hybrid certification approach that has been 
introduced. For the purposes of the evaluation, I will firstly present the hybrid certification 
process, along with the certification processes of other approaches and, then, I will proceed with 
comparing the hybrid approach with the Common Criteria approach, which is based on third-
party certification. Common Criteria (CC) is recognised as one of the most popular and 
distinguished approaches for third party certification, representing a good real-world example of 
third party certification approaches. Also, I will compare my approach with the ISO 27001 
approach, which is based on third-party audit certification and with the CSA Open Certification 
Framework, which is based on self-attestation and third-party audit certification. The 
comparison that follows is based on the certification process of each of the previous approaches. 
Finally, I will outline how my approach for certifying cloud services proves to be more effective 
than the aforementioned certification processes. 
 
4.2.1 Hybrid Certification Approach overview 
First of all, concerning my hybrid certification approach, it is worth mentioning that the entities 
involved in the certification process include a cloud service provider who provides the cloud 
service to be certified and request its certification for a specific security property, a certification 
authority who issues and manages the certificate for the given security property and cloud 
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service, an issuer of the certification model instance who issues and manages the certification 
model instance for the defined certification process, and the executor of the instance who is 
responsible for collecting the evidence. The certification model instance executor and the issuer 
are covered by an accredited Lab. The inputs of the hybrid certification process include the cloud 
service that is requested to be certified and a certification model instance that includes 
information about the TOC, the security property, the conditions for the collection of evidence 
and for the lifecycle of the certificate, while the output of the hybrid certification process is the 
hybrid certificate.  
 
4.2.2 Comparison between the hybrid certification approach and Common Criteria 
Concerning the Common Criteria (CC) approach, it has to be mentioned that the certification 
process is applied to a product and generates certificates that are recognised within the Common 
Criteria Recognition Arrangement. After the product application, the CC approach checks that 
the product implements all the security measures claimed to the level claimed, using penetration 
and functional testing. The entities involved in the certification process include a developer who 
produces the object to be certified, the evaluation laboratory who performs the evaluation 
activities to the entities provided by the developer and the certification body who issues the 
certificates. The inputs of the CC certification process include the product that needs to be 
certified (TOE or Target of Evaluation), the security target which is a document uniquely 
associated to the TOE containing information about the TOE, its functionalities and the 
evaluation activities required, and, finally, additional inputs that involve further documentation 
(development documentation, guidance documentation, testing documentation). The output of 
the CC process is a CC certificate and a certification report that is associated to the CC 
certificate. 
The hybrid certification approach is suitable for certifying services in cloud environments, as it 
provides machine-readable certificates and focuses on automated activities. On the contrary, the 
CC approach is not suitable for certifying services in the cloud, as it is based on costly manual 
actions and activities, such as analysing documentation provided by the developer, thus having a 
human-centric approach. The CC aims at certifying that the product implements a specific set of 
technical security measures. Additionally, the hybrid certification model introduced is based on 
collecting evidence from the service operational environment through testing and monitoring, 
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thus, covering cases where one form of assessment does not provide the sufficient evidence 
required, and also, cases where I just want to confirm the results from one form of assessment 
with the results from the other form of assessment, while the CC approach is based on collecting 
evidence through functional and penetration testing of the interfaces of the object in a controlled 
testing environment.  
My hybrid independent approach supports continuous monitoring, which means that evidence is 
continuously collected through the service lifecycle, providing a continuous assurance, while CC 
approach does not consider new potential vulnerabilities, as testing is performed at regular 
intervals and assurance is restored at fixed moments specified by the certification body. For that 
reason, the lifecycle of the certificate in the hybrid certification model is more complex, but 
proves to be more dynamic, addressing more cases than the ones that can be addressed by the 
CC approach. Finally, my hybrid approach supports the provision of digital signatures, enabling 
the dynamic and automatic processing of the certificates. 
Additionally, the hybrid model enables the certification of security properties from the 
Protection Profiles of the CC that could not be certified without it (such as the authorisation of 
agents who request update of data), as evidence that comes from both testing and monitoring is 
combined. In the previous sections, it became obvious how the hybrid formulas can be used to 
certify the authentication and the incident management quality in an Encrypted Storage Device. 
The CC evaluation process is abstract and the approach is not designed to support automated 
security certification, targeting static, monolithic systems and requiring a large investment of 
resources and time. Consequently, the hybrid model can extend the number of security 
properties that can be certified, and the number of cases that are covered by the Common 
Criteria approach. 
Summarising, the hybrid model introduced can produce availability assessments of higher 
confidence as the monitoring and testing evidence can be cross-checked before being used in an 
assessment (and certificate). Also, hybrid models offer an extended pool of evidence and are 
more customisable than traditional certification models, since they offer the choice of deciding 
how test and monitoring evidence should be correlated, cross-checked and used in assessments. 
Finally, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and cost, it is obvious that the hybrid approach I 
introduced is a better solution concerning the certification of cloud services. 
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4.2.3 Comparison between the hybrid certification approach and ISO 27001 
The ISO 27001 approach is a third-party audit certification approach and includes technical, 
physical and procedural security measures, providing a wide variety of control and 
implementation of these controls. Concerning the certification process, the ISO 27001 approach 
includes an auditing process where an auditor checks if all security measures in an organisation 
are implemented correctly. The entities involved in the certification process include the 
organisation who requests to be certified and is responsible for providing the inputs of the 
certification process, the certified auditor who is accredited by the Certification Body (CB) and 
performs the auditing and the CB that certifies the organisation as compliant with ISO 27001 
and generates the output of the certification process. The final outcome of the ISO 27001 
approach is either a certification or a failure. Additionally, the auditing process takes place 
twice, as firstly, a pre-certification auditing is performed and then, the organisation acts on the 
recommendations and the final auditing is performed. The ISO 27001 certification lasts for three 
years, before the renewal process begins. 
In the ISO 27001 approach the target of certification focuses on the Information Security 
Management System of an organisation and not on a specific cloud service as my hybrid 
approach does. That means that the ISO 27001 approach audits all the procedures for the 
services and does not perform actions directly on cloud services and their underlying cloud 
stack, as my hybrid approach does. Moreover, the ISO 27001 approach is focused on analysing 
reports and documentation provided by the service provider, has a human-centric nature and 
cannot be automated easily, as opposed to the hybrid certification approach I introduced that 
produces machine-readable certificates and supports automation. Concerning the lifecycle of the 
certificate, both my hybrid approach and ISO 2007 are capable of covering occurring changes 
without requiring re-certification from scratch. Finally, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and 
cost, it is obvious that the hybrid approach I introduced is a better solution concerning the 
certification of cloud services, since my approach consists of an automatic approach without 
requiring a certified auditor to certify the whole certification process. 
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4.2.4 Comparison between the hybrid certification approach and CSA’s OCF 
The Open Certification Framework (OCF) developed by CSA is based on self-attestation and 
third-party audit certification, aiming to certify the use of the best practice information security 
management for the cloud. The OCF focuses on the organisational dimension of security and 
translates it to technical measures. The OCF includes the Cloud Control matrix (CCM), which 
comprises of a list of 133 controls that are grouped in 16 domains. Additionally, it allows cloud 
providers to self-assess their adherence to the CCM in two ways. The first way is directly, and 
the second one is through the Consensus Assessment Initiative Questionnaire. The OCF supports 
real-time monitoring, by collecting events and other auditing evince, but this functionality is 
under development.  
While my hybrid approach supports the automatic certification of security properties of the 
cloud services providing machine-readable certificates, the OCF certifies information systems as 
whole entities and includes risk, governance and compliance processes, usually requiring human 
auditing intervention. The OCF can certify qualitative controls that the hybrid approach 
introduced cannot. One example is the certification of the control concerning the compliance 
obligations of an organisation to maintain and update regularly the infrastructure network and 
system components based on the business needs. However, it cannot certify security properties 
that require testing, such as the provision of digital signatures. Concerning the continuous 
monitoring supported by the OCF, it is difficult to evaluate it against my hybrid approach, as this 
component is still under development. Finally, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and cost, it is 
obvious that the hybrid approach I introduced is a better solution concerning the certification of 
cloud services, as it dos not require the intervention of an external certified auditor. 
 
4.2.5 Evaluation Summary 
The following table summarises the findings from the qualitative evaluation, of the comparison 
of the certification process between my hybrid approach and the CC approach, the ISO 27001 
approach and the OCF approach. The evaluation criteria used for the comparison are the nature 
of the approach, the focus of the approach, the validity of the certification outcome, the 
automation of the certification, the need for human auditing intervention, the ability to cover 
potential changes without having to recertify from scratch and the cost efficiency.  
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Criteria Hybrid Approach Common Criteria ISO 27001 OCF 
Nature of the 
approach 
Machine-centric 
approach 
Human-centric 
approach 
Human-centric 
approach 
Human-centric 
approach 
Focus of the 
approach 
Cloud Services Software products Organisations Information 
Systems 
Validity of 
certificate 
Dynamic validity Assurance is 
restored at fixed 
moments 
Needs to be 
renewed every 3 
years 
Not known (as not 
fully developed 
yet) 
Automation of 
certification 
Enabled Not enabled Not enabled Not enabled 
Need for human 
auditing 
intervention 
Not Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable 
Ability to cover 
potential changes  
Enabled Not enabled Enabled Will be enabled 
 
 
Cost efficiency 
Does not require a 
large investment of 
time and money 
Requires a 
sufficient 
investment of time 
and money 
Requires a 
sufficient 
investment of time 
and money 
Not known (as not 
fully developed 
yet) 
Table 7 - Evaluation Summary Table 
 
Concerning the nature of each certification approach, it needs to be said that my hybrid approach 
is the only certification approach of the ones analysed and examined, that provides machine-
readable certificates and has a machine-centric approach. This means that it does not rely on 
human evaluation, auditing and analysis of documents and reports. The CC approach, along with 
the ISO 27001 approach and the OCF approach have a human-centric nature and provide 
certificates that are not machine-readable. Additionally, the hybrid approach is the only approach 
that is automated. This is a strong advantage of the hybrid approach that I developed, as it can 
have broader applicability. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the hybrid approach for the 
certification of cloud services does not require human auditing intervention, as opposed to the 
other certification approaches, and, as a result, it is free of any subjectivity that could be 
introduced with human intervention. Concerning the ability to cover potential changes that may 
occur, the hybrid certification approach, along with the ISO 27001 approach, do not require re-
 143 
 
certification from scratch, as opposed to the Common Criteria approach that is unable to cover 
changes without repeating the certification process again. The OCF approach enables the ability 
to cover potential changes, but it has not been fully implemented yet. In terms of the validity of 
the certificates produced, the hybrid approach is the most dynamic approach of the ones 
analysed, because of its ability to be automated and to cover potential changes without the need 
of human intervention. The assurance in the CC approach is restored at specific points of time, 
making the approach quite flexible and, thus, satisfactory, in terms of validity of the certificates. 
The duration of the OCF approach is not known yet, as it is under development. Finally, when it 
comes to cost efficiency, the hybrid approach is the only approach that does not require a large 
investment of money and time and does not require any external auditing entities. 
At this point, I will present the major drawbacks of the certification approaches analysed above. 
First of all, the CC approach is not suitable for certifying services in the cloud and uses only 
testing to assess and certify security properties, providing abstract certificates. Moreover, as it 
was demonstrated earlier, it fails to certify the percentage of timely incidents reports security 
property and the authentication of data origin, failing to certify the authentication and the 
incident management quality in an Encrypted Storage Device and, thus, proving to be quite 
limited. The ISO 27001 approach is focused on the Information Security Management System of 
an organisation and not on a specific cloud service and requires pre-certification. The OCF 
approach is not fully developed and certifies information systems as whole entities focusing on 
risk, governance and compliance processes. Additionally, the above approaches are not fully 
customisable, as opposed to my hybrid approach for certification, where the user can select the 
elements that will consist the certification model schema for realising the security properties. For 
these reasons, it can be concluded that the hybrid certification approach is the most ideal 
approach for cloud service certification. 
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4.3 Conclusions and Future work 
Hybrid certification combines evidence gathered through testing and monitoring to collect the 
elements that are required to certify a security property. The hybrid approach that I introduced, 
overcomes the limitations of each on of the individual certification processes (i.e. testing or 
monitoring in isolation). Continuous monitoring allows the non-stop observation of the system 
without interfering with it. However, monitoring is insufficient in certain cases, as it can make 
the verification infeasible. More specifically, monitoring requires testing agents to verify 
signatures and inject traffic. On the other hand, testing can be powerful in pre-production 
environments, but on live systems it can interfere with business operations. According to the 
hybrid approach for certifying services in the cloud, monitoring and testing can take place in 
parallel, so that testing can complement monitoring and vice-versa. Monitoring can force the 
execution of testing in order receive the evidence required for assessing security properties, and, 
testing can force the collection of monitoring evidence to compete the assessment. This is 
particularly useful when we want to certify security properties, such as data-integrity-at-rest. 
Additionally, monitoring and testing can take place independently from each other, and the 
evidence from each form of assessment can help to verify the evidence collected from the other 
form of assessment. This is obvious when assessing security properties, such as availability. In 
this way, hybrid security certification provides high confidence in certifying security properties, 
compared to certification schemes based solely on testing or monitoring. The testing and 
monitoring certification model schemas developed for the CUMULUS project include certain 
limitations. More specifically, the test-based certification model schema does not include an 
element for specifying explicitly the interfaces that are provided or required for the certification 
of the TOC. Also, the test-based certification model schema does not include an element 
concerning the expiration period of the evidence collected for the assessment of security 
properties and does not define a state transition model that can drive the mechanisms behind the 
lifecycle element. On the other hand, the monitoring-based certification model schema defines 
different states than the ones defined in the lifecycle element in the test-based certification model 
schema, and, uses a different way of defining the TOC and the security properties to be certified. 
That means, that there were a lot of inconsistencies and incompatibilities between these two 
certification model schemas. 
To overcome the above problems and limitations, a new certification model had to be defined 
that can be applied when certifying security properties for cloud services and evidence are 
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collected through monitoring and testing. So, elements from both certification model schemas 
were used in order to have a universal way of certifying security properties when monitoring and 
testing are performed. Moreover, the hybrid certification model schema was developed taking 
into consideration the gaps of the previous schemas and their incapability of certifying certain 
security properties. As a result, I came up with the idea of a hybrid concept that can lead to the 
certification of a bigger number of security properties and that can provide higher security. My 
hybrid approach was compared with popular third-party certification and auditing approaches. 
After a comparison with the CC approach, the Open Certification Framework and the ISO 27001 
approach, it is clearly obvious that the hybrid approach introduced is the most cost-effective, 
automated and dynamic cloud certification approach, being able, at the same time, to cover 
potential changes and provide dynamically valid certificates. Moreover, it can certify security 
properties that the other approaches fail, such as the authentication and the incident management 
quality in an Encrypted Storage Device, offering an extensive pool of evidence.  
The hybrid approach I introduced, successfully meets the aims and the objectives of my 
research, as it enables the automated and continuous certification of security properties of cloud 
services with high level of assurance, overcoming the limitations of assessments based on testing 
and monitoring, and, reduces the uncertainty arising from reliance on any of the testing and 
monitoring evidence in isolation. The certification of security properties is based on the dynamic 
collection of monitoring and testing evidence. Monitoring is continuous, so that it can cover 
changes at any layer of the cloud that might affect properties already certified, without requiring 
recertification from scratch. Also, a schema has been defined to support the definition of 
executable certification models. This hybrid schema can be used to drive the certification 
process and generate the certificates. Additionally, the certification infrastructure required for 
hybrid certification is presented in my work. For my research, I developed the tools and 
mechanisms that support the management of certificates and the analysis of testing and 
monitoring data that are gathered and are used as evidence in order to generate and issue the 
hybrid certificates, based on hybrid certification models. The examples of hybrid certification of 
security properties provided, demonstrate how the hybrid approach certifies security properties 
that other existing certification models fail to do so. 
 
The evaluation of my approach proves that the hybrid approach presented can confirm the 
reliability, security and potential applicability of the proposed model to the industry. The 
proposed model provides advanced security in cloud service certification and not 
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trustworthiness, as trustworthiness is a generic concept that includes a high degree of 
subjectivity, as already described in Chapter 2. 
 
The biggest strength of my work is that a hybrid certification model was formed to cover the 
gaps arising from testing and monitoring certification. My approach bridges the gaps arising 
from the use of the CUMULUS framework and provides an advanced framework to overcome 
the existing limitations. Additionally, the examples I provided show a potential industrial use 
and applicability of the hybrid certification approach. The biggest limitation of the hybrid 
approach is the fact that it was mostly focused on addressing the needs of the CUMULUS EU 
FP7 Project. Additionally, the certificate authority needs to specify how to correlate the retrieved 
evidence on the basis of a hybrid lifecycle, where the certificate status changes depending on 
conditions triggered by combination of evidence of different types, making the hybrid approach 
complex and less flexible. Another limitation of the hybrid approach is the fact that it cannot 
certify qualitative controls. One example is the certification of the control concerning the 
compliance obligations of an organisation to maintain and update regularly the infrastructure 
network and system components based on the business needs.  
Concerning the future work of my research, I have identified certain areas of investigation for 
future improvements. First of all, it will be helpful for the hybrid approach to be extended so that 
it can support multi-layer certification and can certify cloud services that reside in more than one 
layers of the cloud stack. As a result, in that way, it can become more applicable in the industry. 
In addition, the hybrid certification model defined, could potentially become simpler in order to 
enable higher flexibility and reusability, so that the certification authority does not have to 
specify how the retrieved evidence will be correlated on the basis of a hybrid lifecycle. 
 
4.4 Publication of my Research 
A part of my research on Hybrid Certification Models has been presented in a conference paper 
under the title "Towards Hybrid Cloud Service Certification Models" at the 11th IEEE 
International Conference on Services Computing (IEEE SCC 2014) in Anchorage, Alaska [38]. 
This paper has been published at the CPS Online system for SCC2014 and at the IEEE digital 
library. This publication includes an early version of the hybrid approach for certifying security 
properties of cloud services that combines monitoring and testing data and argues about the need 
for hybrid certification, examining some basic characteristics of hybrid certification models. 
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